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Introduction 
 1947. Peter Josten was an undergraduate student at Bard studying Political Studies with a 
particular interest in the Middle East. He knew he wanted to work in the Middle East in the 
future, but wasn’t quite sure what he would do there. Of all the topics he could have written his 
Senior Project on, he decided on a timely issue: Oil in Saudi Arabia. At the time, WWII had just 
ended and the US was experiencing phenomenal levels of growth. President Roosevelt had met 
face to face with Saudi King Abdul Aziz for the first time. The automobile industry was thriving 
and access to an abundant source of energy was becoming a necessity for every household in the 
nation. Josten clearly saw the growing importance of oil rich nations like Saudi Arabia. For 
advice on how to start his project, he approached Dr. Felix Hirsch, a political journalist and 
historian, who at the time was working as the Bard College Library Director. He likely sought 
advice from Dr. Hirsch because of his experience as a political journalist, which would have 
greatly helped Josten discover and explore numerous international sources including news 
articles from the region. Without the internet or even a fax machine, it would have been essential 
to have a well-versed journalist by his side. This would be the first and until now, the only Senior 
Project at Bard College written on energy in Saudi Arabia. The project has not been uploaded to 
Bard College’s online database, so I requested physical access to it through the Bard Library and 
had to sit, supervised, behind the library information desk in order to turn the pages of what is 
now a deteriorated brown book.  
 I found that, through Josten’s research, he had become fascinated by the rapid rate of 
development in the Kingdom and came to believe that oil would transform the entire landscape 
of the Middle East into a modern geographical hub, connecting all corners of the Earth. The 
Middle East would become an advanced technological region, leading to endless peace and 
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harmony.1 His confidence in oil led him to believe in the possibility of this utopia. He never 
could have foreseen the events that transpired over the following seven decades. Now in 2018, I 
intend to carry on the story of energy in Saudi Arabia. With knowledge of the present day, it is 
easy to criticize or dismiss the vision of Peter Josten. However, I fear that over the next seven 
decades my Senior Project will be equally vulnerable to test of time.  
 
 
 
 When I started research for my project in 2017, I thought I would be writing the David 
and Goliath story of solar energy versus oil. I was excited to see plans for large solar sites 
announced by the Saudi Arabian government and the sensational headlines that covered the 
announcements. “The Saudis are going solar”, “Saudi Arabia to build world’s largest solar farm” 
and “After oil, solar? Saudi Arabia plans ahead” are just a few of the headlines that have grabbed 
my attention. 2 Evidently, there is a considerable buzz surrounding innovations in solar energy in 
general. Yet, a plethora of news organizations, such as Bloomberg News, Reuters, Al Jazeera 
and Arab News, have been providing a running commentary of solar energy’s rise in Saudi 
Arabia since early 2017. There are no signs of this coverage slowing down and each new story 
can provide a new quote from a Saudi government official, an update on solar farm investment 
or a review of progress so far. It is practically impossible to follow every story. With so many 
                                               
1 Peter Josten, “Oil in Saudi Arabia,” Bard College: Senior Projects Spring, (1947). 
2 Jeffrey Ball, “Why the Saudis are Going Solar,” The Atlantic, issue July/August 2015, accessed 24 April, 2018,  
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/07/saudis-solar-energy/395315/, Avery Thompson, “Saudi 
Arabia to Build World’s Largest Solar Farm,” Popular Mechanics, last modified 4 April, 2018, accessed 24 April, 
2018, https://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/a19685494/saudi-arabia-plans-to-build-worlds-largest-
solar-farm, “After Oil, Solar? Saudi Arabia Plans Ahead,” Reuters online, last modified 16 April, 2018, accessed 24 
April, 2018, https://in.reuters.com/video/2018/04/16/after-oil-solar-saudi-arabia-plans-ahead?videoId=418239619.  
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new sources of information to draw from, the question arises: Who do we listen to in order to tell 
the story of energy in Saudi Arabia? 
Traditionally, scholars have not taken official statements by the Saudi Arabian 
government seriously or have at least have been wary of doing so. Robert Vitalis, political 
scientist and author of America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier, is exemplary 
of this mistrusting approach towards the Kingdom. Specifically, he highlights the similarities 
between the state-owned oil company, Saudi Aramco and the Saudi state, arguing that they both 
function as authoritarian regimes. According to Vitalis, they both “keep records hidden. They 
pay for extravagant hagiographies. They open their archive only to those they hire.”3 The 
information produced by both Saudi Arabia and Saudi Aramco is either sanctimoniously 
published or, if the information is found to be unfavorable, dismissed to a hidden filing cabinet. 
In this case, public statements made by the Saudi Arabian government and Saudi Aramco are not 
seen as trusted sources of information, but instead, they are seen as targets to be discredited.  
This project diverges from this trend and “listens” intently to the official statements and 
publications of the Saudi Arabian government. Rather than turning them into targets for 
criticism, I analyze the language used to make these statements and from there, pulls out 
whatever information is available. I make a concerted effort to provide agency to Saudi Arabia, 
similar to how each word of a statement made by the US government is not believed to be a 
campaign of disinformation, but rather is dissected and analyzed.  
The central focus of this essay is therefore on Saudi Arabia’s national transformation 
plan, Vision 2030, announced on 25th April 2016 by Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman.4 
                                               
3 Robert Vitalis, America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi oil frontier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2007), 12. 
4 Marwa Rashad, “Saudis Await Prince's Vision of Future with Hope and Concern,” Reuters online, last modified 
April 24, 2016, accessed April 24, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-plan-idUSKCN0XL0B2.  
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Through analyzing this plan and its published targets, we can understand the current and future 
roles of solar energy and oil in Saudi Arabia. The question I attempt to answer in this project is: 
How does Saudi Arabia intend to utilize solar energy? This is the departure point from which we 
can begin to understand how Saudi Arabia is engaging with the global climate change discourse, 
how oil’s well-established position will affect the rise of solar energy in Saudi Arabia and what 
potential social changes may be brought about by a successful energy transition from oil to 
renewable energies.   
Chapter 1 addresses the global climate change discourse and Saudi Arabia’s contribution 
to this discourse. Looking at official Saudi policies submitted to international bodies as well as 
policies targeting national transformation plans, all of which have been produced in the last ten 
years, we can see how Saudi Arabia approaches the risks of climate change and how it sees itself 
contributing to the alleviation of the problem. Specifically, this chapter will look at the Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Then to see this in action, this 
project will explore the goals of Vision 2030 and its progression from the former Saudi Arabian 
National Development Plan 2020 (NTP 2020). This will include a discussion of how Saudi 
Arabia characterizes energy transition and the rationality that lies behind the reflexive task of 
setting future goals.  
 Chapter 2 provides an insight into the similarities and differences between oil and solar 
energy. Guiding this analysis is the work of Bruno Latour, a French philosopher, anthropologist 
and sociologist, known for his influential contributions to the field of science and technology 
studies. In his seminal book, Reassembling the Social, he argues that social forces alone are too 
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weak to account for anything like the durable and complex structures that amalgamate society.5 
Within this description, Latour posits that the human and non-human must be given equal agency 
if one is to account for all the social factors that form a successful network. Employing this 
Latourian lens, the obvious distinctions between oil and solar become less clear. We are able to 
distinguish the material properties of both forms of energy separate from the systems that 
produce them. The oil field and the solar site are taken as primary examples of the apparent 
disconnect between a resource’s material capabilities and the ways in which certain systems aim 
to produce them. Furthermore, we can begin to reveal the influence of the incumbent energy 
sector over the emerging solar energy production systems. This culminates in a discussion of 
how solar energy can be used as a supplement for the domestic oil consumed in Saudi Arabia, 
which may ultimately increase the resources and time available for Saudi Arabia to export oil to 
the global market.  
Chapter 3 zooms out to the political decision making of the Saudi Arabian government 
and explores its ability to make rapid economic changes while tackling energy transition. This 
includes a discussion of how oil has shaped Saudi Arabia’s political position in the world and 
how an increased interest in solar power marks the ever-growing relationship between Saudi 
Arabia and China. This section also tackles the roles Saudi citizens and foreign workers have 
played in Saudi Arabia’s energy sector. Saudi Arabia’s “Saudization” scheme intends to decrease 
national unemployment and decrease the number of foreign workers in the nation. However, this 
raises the question of how willing Saudi Arabia will be to sacrifice its rate of economic 
transformation for the nationalization of its workforce. 
                                               
5 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An introduction to actor-network-theory (Oxford: Oxford university press, 
2005), 3. 
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To start, we look to the world of climate conferences, in which the nations of the globe 
come together with the aim of cooperation. They represent the highest order of consensus and the 
highest power to dictate the trajectory of a global energy transition from fossil fuels to renewable 
energies. If climate change is a global problem, then these international bodies position 
themselves to be the global solution.  
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Chapter I: The Vision for Energy Transition 
 
1. Climate Agreement: Copenhagen 2009 
1.1 Ambition and minimalism: The global challenge of consensus 
 
 World climate conferences have become the central focus for introducing energy change, 
a change that requires global consensus and national implementation. Observers were 
understandably dismayed to learn in December 2009 that the UN Climate Change Conference 
was a failure.6 The forecast for change had never seemed so inevitable. The pressing issue of 
climate change was well known, liberal governments were optimistic, the voices of NGOs were 
audible in international media and the assembly of 120 governments for a political conference 
had never been seen before. After a week of dramatic calls to action and paralyzed debate, the 
conclusion was to hold another conference and point blame at particular nations for the 
stalemate.7  
 At the time, the late Hermann Scheer was the former President of Eurosolar (European 
Association for Renewable Energy) and General Chairman of the World Council for Renewable 
Energy. Ten years earlier, in 1999, he had been awarded the Right Livelihood Award for his 
indefatigable work for the promotion of solar energy worldwide.8 In his final book, The Energy 
Imperative: 100 per cent renewable now, he remarks that the single guilty party for the failure of 
the Copenhagen conference was “the idea of a world climate conference itself.”9 He explains that 
                                               
6 John Vidal, Stratton Allegra and Suzanne Goldenberg, “Low Targets, Goals Dropped: Copenhagen Ends in 
Failure,” The Guardian US online, last modified 18 December, 2009, accessed 24 April, 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/18/copenhagen-deal. 
7 John Vidal, “Rich and Poor Countries Blame Each Other for Failure of Copenhagen Deal,” The Guardian US 
online, last modified 18 December, 2009, accessed 24 April, 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/19/copenhagen-blame-game. 
8 The Right Livelihood Foundation: A Swedish organization that honors and supports courageous people and 
organizations that have found practical solutions to the root causes of global problems. For more information see 
http://www.rightlivelihoodaward.org/. 
9 Hermann Scheer, The Energy Imperative: 100 percent renewable now (London: Routledge, 2013), 43.  
8 
 
the idea is based upon two highly questionable assumptions: Firstly, a global solution is required, 
in which everyone is subject to similar obligations, as this is a global problem. Secondly, climate 
protection is a burden that nations must equally endure and negotiate.10 He argues that it is 
counterproductive to seek rapid change and achieve global consensus. For rapid changes to be 
enforceable, nations would have to adhere to policies that have the potential to confine their 
freedom to make economic and social decisions, which is a significant request, especially for a 
developing nation. The only way to reach global consensus is to sacrifice the speed of the actions 
required. Therefore, any consensus reached becomes an agreement of, what Scheer terms, 
‘minimal obligation’.  
 The Copenhagen conference was an exemplary case of minimalism. The conference 
agreed that emissions of greenhouse gases should be limited to the heating up of the Earth’s 
atmosphere by no more than 2°C. This notion of a 2°C limit implies that further emissions into 
the atmosphere are acceptable, but that exceeding this target would potentially mark a point of no 
return or at least would lead to environmental catastrophe. This type of target is representative of 
the misunderstanding surrounding the climate change discussion. Rather than actively aiming to 
start decreasing the already high temperature of the atmosphere, countries are allowed to 
continue to contribute to increasing atmospheric temperatures. Considering the possible 
devastation that would be caused by reaching the 2°C target, it seems counterproductive to 
identify a problem and then willingly continue to contribute to it. It is difficult to find an example 
of this in any other area of policy making. While not exactly comparable, we could take the 
UN’s goal for tackling the 800 million malnourished and starving people in the world as an 
example. The policy put forward for this problem is not to allow for the amount of people 
                                               
10 Scheer, The Energy Imperative, 44. 
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experiencing starvation to increase to 2 billion. This would make it acceptable for countries to 
actively contribute to increasing the problem and not have to make major social and economic 
changes. Centering focus on the 2°C target leads to the conditions that permit toothless 
regulations and minimal obligations, while in the meantime, nations can continue to contribute to 
rising atmospheric temperatures. In addition, a false narrative is reinforced that all the problems 
posed by climate change, from rising sea levels to devastating wildlife habitats, can be reduced 
to a single measurement.   
 The 2°C target has become the go to determinant for judging climate change action, a 
trend that has continued in the November 2016 Paris Agreement, a landmark treaty to challenge 
the threat of climate change, signed by 195 nations after intense negotiations in 2015. All 195 
signatories to the agreement could do so confidently, as there are no defined consequences for 
nations that do not meet their targets or for nations that decide to withdraw from the agreement. 
While the Paris Agreement is not enforced, it claims to provide a framework for increasing 
momentum on greenhouse gas reduction, with some oversight and a surface level of 
accountability.11 The Paris Agreement marked a new level of global consensus on climate 
change, but in the process, the speed of action on the issue was sacrificed. It may be argued that 
global consensus is essential to the strength of the movement. However, the current US 
President, Donald Trump, has declared his official position to withdraw the US from the 
agreement, which will likely weaken the it, further highlighting the fragility of international 
consensus.12   
 
                                               
11 For more information on the purpose and current progress of the Paris Agreement see https://unfccc.int/process-
and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement. 
12 Valerie Volcovici, “U.S. Submits Formal Notice of Withdrawal from Paris Climate Pact,” Reuters online, last 
modified August 4, 2017, accessed 24 April, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-climate-usa-paris/u-s-
submits-formal-notice-of-withdrawal-from-paris-climate-pact-idUSKBN1AK2FM. 
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1.2 Successes and contingencies: Saudi National Determined Contribution 
 
This notion of minimal obligation can be observed on the global and national levels. The 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was released in 
November 2015, 6 years after the Copenhagen conference. After years of no notable 
participation in the global climate discourse, Saudi Arabia published their official position in 
regards to climate change. The INDC’s document released sets forth their current energy 
situation, their planned contributions for mitigating climate change, how they will implement 
change and the timeframe they foresee.  
The document starts by stating that economic diversification is of the utmost importance 
to Saudi Arabia’s future climate action. Oil production, processing and export are the primary 
economic activities of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, however there are plausible future 
opportunities for gas, minerals and their derivatives to contribute to the nation’s economy. 
Secondly, since 1970 the Kingdom has utilized ten five-year national development plans that 
have guided the nation’s development and provided economic and social stability in the long-
term. All these plans have centered on diversifying the nation’s economy by aiming to increase 
GDP income from the manufacturing industries, energy and related derivatives, mining, tourism 
and information technology industries. Thirdly, Saudi Arabia foresees two possible scenarios for 
their planned diversification: “1. Economic diversification with a robust contribution from oil 
and its derivatives export revenues. 2. Accelerated domestic industrialization based on 
sustainable utilization of oil and gas.”13  
                                               
13 “Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” UNFCCC, 2015, accessed 13 
February, 2018. http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/Saudi%20Arabia%20 First/KSA-
INDCs%20English.pdf, 2. 
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The first scenario envisions support being provided from high value sectors, such as 
tourism, information technology, renewable energies, financial services and medical services. 
The second scenario envisions a period of economic decline, and that in this case the Kingdom 
will not be able to finance its INDC ambitions and that they will be lowered if deemed necessary. 
Utilizing these two possible scenarios, it appears that Saudi Arabia is not committing to a single 
objective and that their contributions will only be made in reaction to external factors, rather than 
with being motivated by an impetus to reduce the risks of climate change. After these two 
scenarios are outlined in the document, it goes onto conclude that Saudi Arabia will not be 
responsible for the emissions of the fossil fuels they export and that the nation reserves the right 
to “further elaborate on its INDC and make additional submissions to account for these 
scenarios.”14 This final clause marks the toothless nature of Saudi Arabia’s INDC document, in 
which Saudi Arabia’s goals do not account for their global contribution to emission levels and 
that their goals are neither fixed nor mandatory. 
There are two consistent features in the Saudi Arabian INDC document that differ from 
the majority of INDCs from other nations. The first is an absence of quantitative goals, they 
instead state that they intend to implement a number of qualitative measures. If we look at the 
European Union INDC’s document, we can see a plethora of qualitative goals and targets, such 
as setting “a binding target of an at least 40% domestic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 
2030”, aiming to “reduce its emissions by 80-95% by 2050” and planning a reduction of “6 
tonnes of CO2 by 2030.”15 Due to Saudi Arabia not disclosing qualitative goals it becomes 
difficult to specifically understand how serious Saudi Arabia’s commitments are. The document 
                                               
14 “Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” UNFCCC, 2015, 2. 
15 “Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the EU and its Member States,” UNFCCC, 2015, accessed 13 
February, 2018. http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Latvia/1/LV-03-06-
EU%20INDC.pdf, 3.  
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may say Saudi Arabia intends to “cooperate on research programmes”, “implement actions that 
will promote and encourage the reduction, recycle and reuse of water” and “undertake measures 
to enhance desertification management”16, yet the document makes no reference to the specific 
qualitative aspect of these goals, just that they are simply desirable. While we may see more 
specific outlines for these goals within Saudi Arabia’s own national development programs, their 
omission from this document shows a level of reserve in relation to the global climate discourse.  
The second feature is that their goals are on the whole related to financial interests and do 
not relate to potential concerns for the environment. From the first paragraph the document states 
“The Kingdom will engage in actions and plans in pursuit of economic diversification that have 
co-benefits in the form of greenhouse gas.”17 The benefits to the environment are therefore a by-
product of the changes they intend to make and that any direct activity targeted at solely the 
environment is considered a financial sacrifice. 
 
1.3 What is a fair climate agreement for Saudi Arabia? 
Global emissions have primarily resulted from the industrial progresses and lifestyles of 
wealthy nations, while developing nations typically contribute much less to climate change. 
Wealthy nations have plundered and combusted vast quantities of fossil fuels allowing them to 
exponentially grow their economies and offer higher standards of living for their citizens. Now 
the effects of this dramatic growth are better understood, it is the wealthy nations that have 
begun imposing restrictions over poorer nations for the use of the same fuels.  
Michael Grubb is one of the first academics to confront the inequality behind the current 
global climate discourse. He is a Professor of International Energy and Climate Change Policy at 
                                               
16 “Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” UNFCCC, 4. 
17 “Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” UNFCCC, 1. 
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University College London and editor-in-chief of a leading international peer-reviewed academic 
journal, Climate Policy. In the introduction to his article, “Seeking Fair Weather: Ethics and the 
International Debate on Climate Change” published in the International Affairs journal, he points 
to the uncertainty felt by developing nations in response to global climate conferences. He states 
that “Developing countries feared that they would be hurt by a problem that they had played little 
part in creating, whether by the direct impacts or by the perceived burden of efforts to reduce 
emissions.”18 In identifying this hypocrisy, he also adds that it will be the developing nations that 
will be among the first to suffer the consequences of climate change and the many low-lying 
developing nations that will experience the most severe impacts due to rising sea levels.   
It would seem developing nations cannot win. While attempting to grow their economies, 
the tried and tested ways of doing so are being restricted. In order for there to be fair climate 
change action, Grubb remarks that nations must accept responsibility on an ethical level for 
transboundary climate change. He remarks, “One can hardly talk of global order if countries can 
knowingly and over long periods act in ways that impose environmental damage on others and 
not accept responsibility for helping victims to cope with those impacts.”19 The Paris Climate 
Agreement appears to be taking actions upon this basis. Much responsibility for the potential 
negative outcomes of restricting fossil fuel use has been shifted to the most economically 
prosperous nations. For example, in the lead up to the Paris Climate Agreement, the US 
committed to distributing $860 million a year in aid by 2020 to developing nations for the costs 
of climate change adaptation.20 Again, similarly to the other provisions of the agreement, this is 
                                               
18 Michael Grubb, "Seeking Fair Weather: Ethics and the International Debate on Climate Change," International 
Affairs 71, no. 3 (1995): 463. 
19 Grubb, "Seeking Fair Weather: Ethics and the International Debate on Climate Change," 495. 
20 Valerie Volcovici and Lesley Wroughton, “U.S. Doubles Climate Adaption Aid to Nearly $900 Million,” Reuters 
online, last modified 9 December, 2015, accessed 24 April, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-
summit-funding-idUSKBN0TS1Q220151209. 
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not an absolute mandate and US President Donald Trump’s recent comments seemingly confirm 
the fragility of this commitment.  
On this note, it is arguable that Saudi Arabia has contributed dearly to global emissions 
by exporting its wealth of fossil fuels, but it would be more precise to say the nation played a 
more passive role. Saudi Arabia’s resources would not have left the ground if not for the large 
demand for oil coming from the wealthiest nations in the world. The world’s demand for oil 
created the conditions for Saudi Arabia’s economy to become so dependent on oil. Hence, Saudi 
Arabia’s INDC does not sacrifice its ability to export oil or make any concessions to its levels of 
production, however, this does mean the matter of transboundary responsibility is fully settled. 
The main objectives for Saudi Arabia are termed ‘mitigation co-benefits’ within the document, 
solutions that mitigate the effects of climate change while also benefiting the greater wellbeing 
of the nation. These commitments are deemed acceptable by the agreement, not because they are 
greatly contributing to solutions for climate change, but because Saudi Arabia’s commitments 
signify a divergence from business as usual.  
 
2. Vision 2030  
2.1 Characterization of transition: The variations of what energy transition can mean 
 
The idea of an improved and sustainable future should appeal to everyone. To get there 
we must transition, a process of gradual change and the expectation of eventual closure. 
Transition management defines a goal for the future, chooses the subjects and directs the 
movement. In this regard, we can view Vision 2030 as a tool utilized by the transition 
management of Saudi Arabia. Vision 2030 is an economic and social transformation plan that 
addresses broad aspects of Saudi Arabia, but within this program are specific policies to address 
the nation’s energy situation.  
15 
 
To put Vision 2030 into context, we must look at Saudi Arabia’s prior future targets set 
forth in The National Transformation Program (NTP) 2020. The NTP was announced as a 
national plan for the future in December 2015, however just four months later Vision 2030 was 
announced. Their close proximity lends itself to confusion. There is a considerable overlap 
between the goals of both programs and at first glance, it can be difficult to distinguish them 
from each other. Upon further inspection, the NTP targets were released for the individual 
governmental ministries of Saudi Arabia, whereas Vision 2030 takes a broader approach by not 
mentioning the direct ministries involved and instead attached its goals to the large categories of 
“Society, Economy and Nation”.21 Soon after the announcement of Vision 2030, the NTP was 
absorbed to become one of 12 programs within Vision 2030. As a result, many of the 
government agencies that were originally part of the NTP program are no longer directly 
involved, including the energy, finance and housing ministries.  
The NTP’s consequential absorption and its short four-year timeline make the program 
appear less significant in comparison to the progressive long term changes promised by Vision 
2030. Yet, for four short months, the NTP was to be received as the progressive and forward 
thinking plan for Saudi Arabia. The quick revision of the NTP and its short timeline suggest that 
the program was rushed and that it may not have represented the full goals of the Saudi 
Government. However, the NTP provided a careful articulation of the challenges Saudi Arabia 
wished to address and the methods for implementing this change. For this reason this essay will 
first explore the characteristics of the NTP and contrast them with that of Vision 2030, in an 
effort to provide context for the rationale of Saudi Arabia’s planned transition. 
                                               
21 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, “Themes,” Saudi Vision 2030, 2016, accessed 20 January, 2018. 
http://vision2030.gov.sa/en. 
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 In order to understand the rationale for embarking on any transition, we must precisely 
identify the sites of interest and the type of transition they are to undergo. To answer this we 
cannot simply comment on the desired overall social structural change, such as a stronger 
economy or increased social mobility. For within this change exists layers of transitions that 
overlap and interconnect various societal subsystems. 
James Meadowcroft is a head researcher for the Canada Research Chair who focuses on 
the ways governments are adjusting their practices and policies to cope with the emergence of 
problems of the environment and sustainable development. In his recent essay, ‘What about the 
politics? Sustainable development, transition management, and long term energy transitions”, he 
offers several changes that he believes can characterize energy transition: 
 
(a) movement from a fossil fuel based (or dominated) energy system to a non-fossil fuel 
based (or dominated) energy system; or (b) a shift from a carbon emitting energy system 
to a carbon neutral (or low carbon) energy system;  
or (c) a transition from a non-renewable energy system to a renewable energy system. 
Other alternatives are also possible, for example, (d) a movement from an insecure 
(vulnerable) energy system to a secure (robust) energy system.  
And (e) a change from centralized energy provision to a decentralized energy system.22 
 
Each of these different transitions require different actions. The underpinning notion of 
energy transition could incorporate a variety or just one of these characterizations and ultimately 
Saudi Arabia will regard some of these objectives as a priority over others. These priorities have 
important consequences for the social and economic condition of Saudi Arabia. For example, if 
Saudi Arabia was to prioritize energy security within its policy, then the occurrence of 
militaristic agitation or political instability would likely create further preference for the 
reliability of the established oil energy system. Consequently, CO₂  output levels would rise and 
                                               
22 James Meadowcroft, "What About the Politics? Sustainable Development, Transition Management, and Long 
Term Energy Transitions," Policy sciences 42.4 (2009): 323. 
17 
 
investment would continue towards a controllable centralized energy system. In addition, these 
consequences immediately impact the citizens, industries, cities and regions whose opportunities 
are intrinsically limited to the energy priorities of their government.  
This rubric can be applied to the energy transition goals set forth in the NTP. The 
program comprises the goals of Saudi Arabia by segmenting the various ministries and 
departments within the Saudi Government. Within each of these segments are ‘strategic 
objectives’ that outline the areas that each ministry wishes to improve.23 The Ministry of Energy 
lists an order of 15 strategic objectives for the development of its energy sector in a decisive 
manner. The first objective is to “increase non-oil commodities exports”, this includes an 
increase in gas and mineral exports, but also establishing ‘specific zones’ of competitive 
advantage which could potentially include a renewable energies market. 24 However, this is not 
stated explicitly. This first priority for Saudi Arabia reveals less about the intent for a specific 
characterization of energy transition than it does the economic diversification desired for 
improving the economy. While this may suggest movement away from oil, out of the following 
14 objectives, 10 set out the objective of developing and strengthening the oil sector.25 Whether 
it be encouraging financial investment, increasing efficiency or investing in energy 
infrastructure, the Ministry of Energy clearly sets forth a future of continued interest in 
sustaining the current oil energy system. Furthermore, the Ministry of Energy’s objectives do not 
mention a comprehensive plan for the integration of renewable energies systems or decreasing its 
contribution to climate change.  
                                               
23 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. “National Transformation Program,” Vision 2030, 2016, accessed 20 January, 2018.  
http://vision2030.gov.sa/sites/default/files/NTP_En.pdf  
24 “National Transformation Program,” Vision 2030, 50. 
25 “National Transformation Program,” 50. 
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Separate from the ministries’ objectives are a small list of government programs. One of 
these programs is the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energies program 
(K.A.CARE), whose goals are summarized as 4 strategic objectives. The first objective does not 
pertain to renewable energies, but sets forth the goal of reaching 100% of atomic energy 
production, as allowed by “international and national safety and security standards regarding the 
introduction of atomic energy.”26 To implement this, Saudi Arabia announced in 2009 plans to 
construct 16 nuclear power reactors over the next 20-25 years.27 Up to this moment this objective 
has resulted only immaterial progress. While Saudi Arabia opened the contract bidding for its 
first nuclear plant in 2017, they are yet to award a contract, let alone begin construction.28  
If we take into consideration the development plans for nuclear energy in other nations, 
we can see how the K.A.CARE objective is questionable and perhaps, unreasonable. Egypt set 
up its Atomic Energy Commission in 1955. The government's Nuclear Power Plants Authority 
was then established in 1976, and in 1978 plans were created for ten reactors by 1999. Ten years 
later, in May 2009 the government finally awarded the first contract to WorleyParsons, an 
Australian engineering company, to support the establishment of a large nuclear plant. These 
plans were put on hold due to the political instability caused during the popular uprisings of 
2011. By November 2017, contracts were signed for the first nuclear power plant by Egyptian 
President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Russian President Vladimir Putin. To this date Egypt is yet to 
produce a watt of power for domestic consumption by the means of a nuclear reactor.29 The slow 
                                               
26 “National Transformation Program,” 72. 
27 “Nuclear Power in Saudi Arabia,” World Nuclear Association, accessed 20 January, 2018. http://www.world-
nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/saudi-arabia.aspx 
28 “Nuclear Power in Saudi Arabia,” World Nuclear Association. 
29 “Nuclear Power in Egypt,” World Nuclear Association, accessed 20 January, 2018. http://www.world-
nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/egypt.aspx. See here for a more in depth timeline of 
Egypt’s engagement with nuclear energy. 
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process Egypt has experienced is not unique to Egypt. Rather, this exemplifies the uncertainty 
that underpins the development of nuclear energy programs. Hence, the NTP’s atomic energy 
goals for 2020 are unlikely to be fulfilled within the next two years. 
Considering atomic energy is the first objective of the K.A.CARE program, it casts a 
shadow over the ratification of the latter 3 objectives of K.A.CARE. These objectives pertain to 
enabling renewable energy systems to contribute to the national energy mix, investing in the 
development of renewable energy technologies and creating the expertise and labor force 
required for a competitive renewable energy market.30 While nuclear power requires slow 
negotiation of international safety and disputes over nuclear waste management, global interest 
has exploded around the recent innovations of renewable energies.31 This draws attention to the 
priorities of the NTP, as global trends appear misaligned with its minor and vague objectives for 
a renewable energy market. If we were to identify the characterization of Saudi energy transition 
on the goals and achievements of the NTP, we would conclude that Saudi Arabia is prioritizing 
the security and strength of its existing centralized energy systems. Furthermore, the transition 
plan set out by the NTP does not appear to distinctly register with the rubric provided by 
Meadowcroft. However, the NTP’s limelight was short lasting and Vision 2030’s hasty 
absorption of the NTP provides Saudi Arabia with new space to reevaluate the NTP’s 
misalignment of global energy trends.   
Vision 2030 extends the trajectory of Saudi’s 2020 targets and refocuses the objectives of 
Saudi transition management. While the NTP was attached to a faceless governmental body, 
                                               
30 “National Transformation Program,” Vision 2030, 72.  
31 For more information on the popular rise of renewables see Pilita Clark, “The Big Green Bang: how renewable 
energy became unstoppable,” Financial Times, 18 May, 2017. https://www.ft.com/content/44ed7e90-3960-11e7-
ac89-b01cc67cfeec. 
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comprised of ministries and programs, Vision 2030 is the vision of Crown Prince Mohammad 
bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud. The Crown Prince has become a prominent figure within the 
Saudi regime and is the select successor of the current King. While he may not be the head of 
state officially yet, he began a process of consolidating his power by arresting powerful 
economic and political actors, including his own relatives in late 2017. A total of 325 people 
were reportedly detained at the Ritz-Carlton luxury hotel in the capital, Riyadh. The results of 
this, so-called, purge led to the recuperation of $100 billion and the more permanent 
imprisonment of more than 50 individuals.32 This turmoil is represented as a ‘crackdown’ on 
corruption, whether this is true or not, it marks the establishment of the Crown Prince’s 
authority.  
Visiting the Vision 2030 website, one is first confronted by multiple images of the Saudi 
King and Crown Prince squinting their eyes, looking towards a prospective future and behind 
them a colorful and abstract cloudscape. To articulate the meaning of this image a foreword is 
provided by the Crown Prince, the current Chairman of the Council of Economic and 
Development Affairs. His foreword contains a highly informative quote that summarizes the 
ideology behind Vision 2030, “we cannot help but be optimistic about the decades ahead. We 
ponder what lies over the horizon rather than worrying about what could be lost.”33 This quote 
implies that the concerns of the past are merely unnecessary obstacles in front of getting to the 
future. In this sense, the lackluster of the NTP’s achievements can be considered irrelevant to the 
Saudi regime and this allows for focus and energy to be redirected from the NTP towards the 
long term goals of Vision 2030. While we may not be able to see the future ahead, we are made 
                                               
32 Martin Chulov, “Saudi Arabia Claims Anti-Corruption Purge Recouped $100bn,” The Guardian, 30 January, 
2018, accessed 24 April, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/30/anti-corruption-purge-nets-more-
than-100bn-saudi-arabia-claims. 
33 “Foreword,” Saudi Vision 2030. http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/foreword 
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to feel rest assured that the glimmering pupils of King Abdulaziz and the Crown Prince hold the 
promise of an inevitably improved future. 
Unlike the NTP, it is difficult to discern the precise objectives of Vision 2030. Vision 
2030 discusses its aims through the broad themes of “a Thriving Economy, a Vibrant Society and 
an Ambitious Nation”.34 The methods for achieving these themes are comprised of specific 
programs and initiatives. While one would assume Vision 2030 is primarily concerned with the 
year 2030, the NTP 2020 remains the cornerstone program of Vision 2030. Instead of viewing 
2020 as the deadline for the NTP, Vision 2030 extends the goals of the NTP, whilst also 
bolstering it with additional programs. Instead of trying to separate the overlapping goals of the 
NTP and Vision 2030, they are embraced together and the language of ‘strategic objectives’ is 
replaced by ‘relevant Vision 2030 objectives’. It is unclear whether the 2020 goals are now set 
for 2030 or if the Saudi Government will take stock and update its goals in 2020.  
To add to the confusion, Vision 2030 has also absorbed the K.A.CARE program. While 
the K.A.CARE program has not made further targets within the 2030 timeframe, Vision 2030 
has repositioned the program’s importance. There are only two short paragraphs in the Vision 
2030 document about the work of K.A.CARE, yet they make ambitious commitments. The 
Vision 2030 document is silent on the details but does commit to 9.5GW of renewable power 
generation capacity by 2022, specifically mentioning wind and solar.35 This is presented as an 
effort to offset Saudi Arabia’s current domestic consumption of fossil fuels, which has led Saudis 
to coin the term ‘yellow oil’. The Vision 2030 document goes on to say, “From inputs such as 
silica and petrochemicals, to the extensive expertise of our leading Saudi companies in the 
                                               
34 “Home,” Vision 2030. http://vision2030.gov.sa/en 
35 “A Renewable Energy Market,” Vision 2030. http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/node/87 
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production of different forms of energy, we have all the raw ingredients for success.”36 This 
sentence is quite far reaching and seems to commit the Kingdom to harnessing its natural 
resources into developing a domestic manufacturing base for solar equipment. It must be noted 
that at this time, Saudi Arabia neither has a utility scale solar farm nor produces any significant 
quantity of renewable energy. Nevertheless, renewable energies have gained a pivotal role in the 
diversification of the Saudi’s oil dominated economy. 
In a further contrast to the NTP, Vision 2030 has consistently made the headlines of 2017 
and 2018 so far. Specifically, ‘solar’ has become the buzzword for describing Vision 2030. 
Almost every week a new article is published that embellishes Saudi Arabia’s progress into the 
field of solar energy. Bloomberg, a business news outlet, published over a dozen articles 
referring to Vision 2030 during February 2018, Reuters, an international news outlet, has 
published over 100 articles referring to solar power in Saudi Arabia in the past year and from 
pro-Saudi Government, Arabic language news outlets, such as Al-Riyadh, Al-Bilad and Al-
Madina, the articles published on this subject are even more numerous.37 This publicity frames 
solar as a new exciting expedition for the world and that Saudi Arabia aims to be at its forefront. 
The consistent publishing of these articles would suggest that decisive actions are being taken 
and that progress is continuously being made. However, Vision 2030 has not officially published 
any further targets than those presented in the two aforementioned paragraphs within the Vision 
2030 document, nor have any contracts for solar farms been signed by the Saudi Government. 
                                               
36 “Investing for the Long-Term,” Vision 2030. http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/node/6 
37 While many of these articles in Bloomberg and Reuters overlap in content or simply provide opinion pieces on 
the topic, the quantity at which they’re published would suggest that they are highly popular with readers. The pro-
Saudi Government news outlets may not publish these articles because of their popularity, it is more likely that this 
constantly unfolding story is pushed forward by the Saudi Government. A recent headline from Al-Bilad reads, 
“ملاعلا يف ةيسمشلا ةقاطلل عورشم ربكأ قلطت ةيدوعسلا“. In English: “Saudi Arabia Launches the World’s Largest Solar 
Project.” (my own translation).   Last modified 29 March, 2018, accessed 28 April, 2018, 
http://www.albiladpress.com/newspaper/3453/488340.html. 
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Often these articles rearticulate the same information, and if they receive a high number of hits, 
they quickly spread across a plethora of international news outlets. It may be tempting to attach 
these news outlets’ comments within our analysis of Vision 2030, but there simply isn’t a 
justification on behalf of Saudi Arabia’s transition management for these attractive headlines.   
Returning to Meadowcroft’s rubric for transition, we can see that Vision 2030 suggests a 
movement from a fossil fuel based energy system to a non-fossil fuel based energy system and 
also, a transition from a non-renewable energy system to a renewable energy system. It is 
difficult to gauge how far along these transitions Saudi Arabia will be by 2030, but their 
prominent inclusion in Vision 2030 marks a palpable readjustment from the meager role of 
renewable energies in the NTP 2020. This is the conclusion presented by Vision 2030, however, 
it does not fully satisfy many of the tensions that exist between the global rise of renewable 
energies and the global position of Saudi Arabia as an oil producer.  
 
2.2 Closure and delays: Why 2030 is not the end of transition for Saudi Arabia 
 
By naming Saudi Arabia’s transition program Vision 2030, a number of transitional 
ideologies are evoked. 2030 is made to be the finish line, a point at which a new equilibrium is 
reached. It is worth reflecting on the extent to which it is possible to anticipate decisive 
movement towards some form of closure in the large scale systems that concern energy transition 
management. It is important to note that Vision 2030 does not explicitly state the word 
‘transition’ to describe itself. It is not clear if ‘transition’ has been purposely omitted from the 
Vision 2030 document, however, the word ‘transformation’ has been carried over in some cases 
from the NTP 2020. Nevertheless, ‘transition’ most aptly describes the nature of Vision 2030 and 
is the most prominent term used to describe such a program within the academic field of 
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sustainable development, especially in regards to energy. The term ‘transition’ evokes the image 
of a form or state following a passage to emerge as another, which includes not only the idea of 
movement, but also arrival. Examples of this in the context of energy could be the transition 
from coal to oil powered ships in the British Royal Navy and maritime transport, or in U.S. 
households from coal based heating to gas and oil heating systems. While these historic 
examples display closure in energy transition, the sustainable development of energy systems 
today will likely be a less satisfying process with many open ends and detours. Energy transition 
today must engage with much larger sociotechnical systems that have local, national and 
international ramifications.  
Vision 2030 does not hold the promise of just one transition, but a sequence of 
transitional trajectories. These trajectories are subject to unforeseen external pressures, which 
may cause Saudi transition management to adjust their goals and targets. It is not unimaginable 
that climate change could cause an increase in natural disaster frequency and severity, which in 
turn creates a disruptive landscape for planned transition. An increase in water scarcity and high 
temperatures for Saudi Arabia would spell catastrophe and motivate increased activity towards 
alleviating future climate change risks. In this sense, the deterministic title ‘Vision 2030’ is to an 
extent misleading, as the Vision alone will not provide the final outcome in 2030. From the 
vantage point of 2100 we may be able to discern the transition pathway that was taken, however 
while we are currently observing from within the transition timeline it much more difficult to 
understand what is really happening.  
 Furthermore, Vision 2030 does not fully reflect the open ended nature of sustainable 
development that is the source of motivation for energy transition. Since the horizon of the 21st 
century we can easily observe a plethora of scientific and technological advances in sustainable 
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development, such as viable solar energy production, smart energy meters in homes and electric 
cars. This suggests that sustainable development is not simply an endpoint but that it will remain 
a continuous challenge far into the future. In this sense, the concept of Saudi Arabia arriving at 
the position of a sustainable society in 2030 differs greatly from the task of sustainable 
development. While the organization of several sequential or concurrent subsystem transitions 
may suggest progress, they are only a part of the continuous process of sustainable development.   
 One of the biggest obstacles facing a successful energy transition in Saudi Arabia is the 
incumbent state-owned energy company, Aramco. It is no secret that the company stands to 
benefit greatly from delaying a full transition to renewable energy sources. This company 
represents the current energy equilibrium for Saudi Arabia and its far reaching influence has 
caused sociotechnical incapacitation. To an extent the great success experienced by Saudi Arabia 
in oil production has bound the society within a suboptimal situation. Currently, the incumbent 
energy systems enjoy the advantages of established infrastructure, networks for consumers and 
suppliers, developed regulatory systems and low financial risks. All of these elements have 
developed over time in tandem to create mutual cooperation between other major subsystems 
within society, such as agriculture and transport. Outcompeting such a dominating structure will 
likely be difficult.  
 Outside of their general structure, the specific actions taken by the incumbent energy 
company to delay their emerging rivals are less visible. Aramco and the government of Saudi 
Arabia are so tightly entwined that energy transition efforts in Vision 2030 are subject to the 
influence of the interests of the incumbent energy system. One of these influences could be 
identified as the attempt to introduce atomic energy. While nuclear power helps to reduce CO₂  
emissions, there are additional risks and dangers caused by nuclear energy production and there 
26 
 
are a variety of factors that impact climate change other than CO₂ . Aramco is unlikely to feel 
threatened by Vision 2030’s desire to produce nuclear energy and may stand to benefit from time 
invested into the sector. If Egypt’s experience of nuclear energy unfolds similarly for Saudi 
Arabia, then it will not prove to be a bridge technology for energy transition, but instead, a delay. 
To understand why Vision 2030’s nuclear energy goals represent a delay for Saudi Arabia, we 
must understand the current global nuclear energy trends.  
 The World Nuclear Association reports that 450 civil nuclear reactors are operational 
across 32 countries, with an additional 60 under construction.38 The average lifespan of these 
nuclear energy plants is 20-25 years, meaning all the plants that became operational before the 
year 2000 will need to be decommissioned within the next decade. These soon to be 
decommissioned nuclear plants account for almost half of the operational plants today. While 
there may be plans (without secured deadlines) for an additional 150-160 reactors, the World 
Nuclear Status Report 2018 produced by Mycle Schneider reveals how these plans will not be 
able to sustain current nuclear energy production. His statistics show that for nuclear energy 
production levels to remain equal to 2018 in 2025, that at least over 140 new plants need to be 
constructed within this decade.39 This means a new plant needs to become operational 
approximately every 23 days. If this level of construction was indeed a reality, it would be the 
highest since 218 nuclear power plants became operational in the 1980’s; approximately one 
every 17 days.40  
                                               
38 “Nuclear Power in the World Today,” Nuclear World Association. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-
library/current-and-future-generation/nuclear-power-in-the-world-today.aspx 
39 “World Nuclear Industry Status as of 1 January 2018,” World Nuclear Industry Status Report. 
https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/World-Nuclear-Industry-Status-as-of-1-January-2018.html 
40 “World Nuclear Industry Status as of 1 January 2018,” World Nuclear Industry Status Report. 
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In the long term, even with advancements made concerning the lifespan and efficiency of 
nuclear reactors, global trends suggest that nuclear energy is a declining factor for energy 
transition. Vision 2030’s objective to diversify their energy sources away from oil for economic 
security is not progressed by nuclear power, instead it provides a financially beneficial delay for 
the incumbent energy sector. While time and resources are funneled into nuclear energy, it is the 
same time and resources that are taken away from developing renewable energies.      
 
2.3 State rationality: Setting future goals in energy transition governance 
 
The concept of a vision for future sustainable development involves reforming and 
creating practices of socio-political governance in an effort to encourage a desired development 
trajectory. By planning for the future we imply that it is possible to ‘steer’ society and that if it 
were left to take its natural course, our limited ability to determine the future would inevitably 
cause ourselves harm. Our future plans cannot be set in stone, as sustainable development is an 
interactive process including not just the combination of sectors and their instruments, but also in 
the broader sense, sustainable development is process of exploration to find the preferred 
pathway. This points to a state’s ability to reflect. Meadowcroft argues that “such reflexivity is 
arguably important for modern governance generally, sustainable development because of the 
broad reach, normative foundations, and multilayered uncertainties with which this idea is 
associated.”41 Modern governance therefore requires continuous self-conscious societal 
reflection, assessment and readjustment. This notion of reflexivity is of the utmost importance 
for Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, as its broad promises and unclear trajectory are a major 
contribution to feelings of uncertainty within the Kingdom. 
                                               
41 James Meadowcroft, "What About the Politics? Sustainable development, transition management, and long term 
energy transitions," Policy sciences 42, no. 4 (2009): 323. 
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While future planning of the past involved gradual adjustments of taxes, regulations and 
tariffs, the notion of evolutionary change is becoming increasingly vital to successful energy 
transition management. Rather than betting on the success of one goal, energy transition 
management deliberately encourages a variety of technologies and systems combined with 
selective pressures, allowing for victors and adjustments of future development trajectories. René 
Kemp in his essay, “Transition management as a model for managing processes of co-evolution 
towards sustainable development”, introduces the theory that transition management should be 
viewed as “a new steering concept that relies on 'Darwinistic' processes of guided variation and 
selection instead of planning.”42 Transition management is described as “new” because the 
previous alternative for nations has been the use of economic incentives within a planning and 
implementing approach, often weak and too general while simultaneously being disruptive. This 
suggests that energy transition management is not simply another tool, but a different type of 
governance model for states.  
 Transition management offers an array of new features that change our approach to 
setting future goals. It places a specific emphasis on bringing the future to the center of current 
decisions by utilizing long term time frames, experimenting with a variety of trajectories and 
encouraging innovation. Furthermore, it sets its sights on transforming established systems 
within which unsustainable practices are deeply ingrained. Through this effort they create a 
network of powerful actors involved in a specific area of production and consumption, within 
which the actors are given space to define their challenges, discuss their different perspectives 
                                               
42 René Kemp, Derk Loorbach, and Jan Rotmans, "Transition Management as a Model for Managing Processes of 
Co-Evolution Towards Sustainable Development," The International Journal of Sustainable Development & World 
Ecology 14.1 (2007): 7. 
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and collaborate on fundamental steps. In transition management, technological and social change 
are conducted in tandem with the understanding that both forms of progress are essential for 
successful sustainable development.      
We would be remiss not to acknowledge that politics and political processes are deeply 
embedded within the concept of setting future goals. While transition management concerns 
itself with the features referred to above, traditional policy tools, such as taxation, regulation and 
subsidization, remain a vital tool for a government managing sustainable development. This is 
often understated within discussions of transition management, for example, System Innovation 
and the Transition to Sustainability: Theory, Evidence and Policy by Boelie Elzen, Frank W. 
Geels and Kenneth Green is a prominent influential piece of literature within the academic 
discussion of transition management. These transition theorists go to great effort to differentiate 
themselves from the regulatory, taxation and planning approaches of traditional governance, 
however it is perhaps more plausible that these approaches are a part of transition management 
itself, for there’s no practical reason for it to limit itself in this way.43 
While transition management is not primarily concerned with political interactions, it 
formulates itself through socially determined goals. This requires continuous public support, 
even though this social agreement, the negotiation of competing objectives and the distribution 
of particular resources throughout diverse social spheres may fall outside of transition 
management’s defined scope. This is not to say that deciding on socially defined goals is 
completely divided from their implementation, as the pursuit of these goals entails numerous 
                                               
43 Boelie Elzen, Frank W. Geels, and Kenneth Green, System Innovation and the Transition to Sustainability: 
theory, evidence and policy (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004), 20. In the section “Literature Review and Critical 
Evaluation”, they stress the weakness of economic pathways and emphasize the importance of transformation 
approaches, in which the new is perceived to be growing out of the old.  
 
 
30 
 
decisions that influence how this process eventually unfolds. Nevertheless, it is not expected of 
transition management to make decisions that allocate benefits and detriments across social and 
sectoral borders, for this would require some form of political framework for deliberative 
processes.  
Thus, it should be no surprise that transition goals raise new questions for political actors 
and organizations to consider. Within the political sphere, these questions are subject to a whole 
host of ideological and institutional factors, such as the public's level of political engagement, the 
dynamics of party politics, party cooperation and political lobbying. The previous discussion of 
atomic energy within the NTP of Saudi Arabia demonstrates this clearly. While Saudi Arabia 
appears to be seeking dramatic progress in this sector, the political problems they face have not 
been diminished by setting out its goal. Nuclear power, while utilized with success in many 
nations, is a technology surrounded by uncertainty in general. The immensity of Saudi Arabia’s 
nuclear ambitions seem unattainable within the timeframe they’ve set themselves and while 
nuclear power could reduce carbon emissions, it does not address a number of environmental 
concerns it either does not affect or worsens. Hence, if their nuclear goals are to be achieved, 
significant investment, subsidization of infrastructure and creating policies that require the 
energy sector to concede territory to nuclear energy are undeniably essential or else nuclear 
energy will face continuous delays and pitfalls. However, the time and level of investment 
required drastically reduces attention to making progress on other energy transition trajectories. 
For a nation like Saudi Arabia with limited resources, garnering support for and making these 
decisions will be difficult. Making these decisions along the trajectory of energy transition is 
clearly a political concern and one that only the political authority of Saudi Arabia can make.  
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Chapter II: Oil’s Role in Energy Transition 
 
1. Replacement without revolution: The design and implementation of solar energy in 
Saudi Arabia 
 
The scientific consensus on climate change tells us that oil and its externalities have 
permanently damaged the Earth and if we are to avoid further catastrophe nations must quickly 
implement technological innovations made in the field of renewable energies. Emerging as one 
of the most popular forms of renewable energy production is solar farms. In the Middle East they 
are promised to transform oil economies and create new ‘desert economies’ in countries like 
Saudi Arabia. Yet, until the goal of 100% renewable energy is met, oil and solar must operate 
side by side in a competing market. This raises the question of whether solar projects will be 
designed to replace oil’s role or will these projects create systems for energy that haven’t existed 
before? And to what extent do the pre-existing systems of oil production and distribution 
influence how solar will be utilized? To answer these questions, this project argues that solar 
farms are in fact a technological detour on the path to combating climate change. This ‘detour’ 
could be considered to be a slight adjustment of the current energy system that produces oil. By 
way of confining the material properties of solar to the framework of this previous system, the 
longevity of the system that produces oil is extended.  
We must first start with the technical system that defines the current implementation of 
solar energy on solar farms. While homeowners install several solar panels on their roofs with 
the aim of generating enough energy to appease their own consumption, large utility-scale solar 
farms made up of millions of solar cells aim to generate enough energy to appease the energy 
demand of thousands of businesses and homes. How do solar farms work? A solar farm provides 
energy to the electric grid much like fossil fuel energy plants, with the exception being that solar 
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farms produce zero pollution and use considerably less water than traditional power plants. On 
the ground, photovoltaic (PV) cells manufactured out of amorphous silicon are assembled into 
panels, each capturing a relatively small amount of the sun’s energy. These panels are then 
installed on top of small posts and can cover thousands of acres, creating a sea of shimmering 
surfaces.44   
Solar farms vary in how they place their panels, some fix their PV panels in a static 
position, while others utilize a tracking system to follow the most efficient angle to the sun for 
energy production. A single panel produces little energy, it is the culmination of thousands of 
panels that create significant energy production, and hence solar farms are so large. Solar 
developers therefore need to buy or lease large amounts of land in order to be productive. 
Concentrated solar plants (CSP) use less land and utilizes mirrors and lenses to concentrate the 
sun’s rays into heat, which drives a variety of more conventional generator systems. Despite the 
benefit of taking up less land, PV solar farms are much more popular and outnumber CSPs by 40 
to 1.45   
Energy from the panels does not have to be used immediately. Many recent 
breakthroughs in solar have been in the technology used to store excess energy produced. The 
advent of solar batteries allows for energy to be stored for later use and expand the capacity of 
the solar system itself. During the night there is no source of energy for solar panels to absorb 
and therefore batteries are essential for providing energy during the unproductive segment of the 
24 hour day. As a bonus, the energy stored in solar batteries serves as a short-term backup power 
source in the event that there’s a power outage or shortage in a given area. 
                                               
44 For more in depth description of the technical system that produces solar energy on a solar farm see 
https://www.solar-trade.org.uk/solar-farms/. 
45 “U.S. solar market insight report 2013 year in review,” GTM Research and Solar Energy Industries Association 
(SEIA), Boston, MA, and Washington, DC (2014).  
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Expanding out to the larger connectivity of solar farms, two gigantic plans for solar 
energy, the DESERTEC Project and the North Sea Project, have captured the imagination of the 
public. The two projects both aim to supply energy to Europe from electricity generated by solar 
farms located in desert regions of the MENA region. Connecting the regions would be a 
transcontinental network of new high-voltage transmission lines. These connective systems has 
been termed the “super-grid”, and is praised as providing a panacea for overcoming all the 
apparent insoluble problems of solar-generated power.46 These projects would take decades to be 
fully realized and their grand design would cost near a billion dollars, which shows an alignment 
of the promotion of renewable energies and a desirable profit margin for business interests. 
Fundamentally, these projects represent the peak of a centralized energy system, perhaps even 
more centralized than the traditional energy system. They work under the logic that a new 
centralized structure for delivering renewable energies is needed, despite the decentralized nature 
of renewable energies being available at their point of consumption. Ultimately, projects like 
DESERTEC seek to decrease the amount of players involved in renewable energies for the 
benefit of the power industry and to the disadvantage of the regional and local level. While 
advance in design and some might say ‘innovative’, the process of limiting the number of players 
involved and limiting the sites of production allows for a mechanism of spatial concentration of 
production, commercial concentration of capital and the spatial concentration of value creation to 
arise as a reflection of the traditional energy system.  
Taking an initial glance at the technical processes required to produce oil, we see the 
differences between solar energy and fossil fuel energy. The story of oil begins hundreds of 
millions of years ago. Tiny plants and animals died and sank into the sand and mud at the bottom 
                                               
46 Rajiv K. Varma, Shah Arifur Rahman and Tim Vanderheide, "Novel Nighttime Application of PV Solar Farms as 
STATCOM (PV-STATCOM)," In Power and Energy Society General Meeting, 2012 IEEE, 1-2. 
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of the sea. Over millions of years, the organisms decayed into the sedimentary layers of the 
Earth. As new sedimentary layers were deposited, they began to exert pressure and heat onto the 
underlying layers of sand, mud and decaying organisms. This heat and pressure distilled the 
carbon molecules of decaying organic matter into crude oil and natural gases. As the matter 
liquidated into oil, it began to flow into more porous layers of limestone and sandstone becoming 
reservoir rock. The movement of the Earth’s tectonic plates trapped oil between layers of 
impermeable rock and formed vast reservoirs of compressed liquid organic matter.47  
In order to extract the precious liquid stored below the Earth’s surface, a hole is first 
drilled down to the optimal depth for sustained oil extraction. Once this depth has been reached 
the drills are removed and a crew assembles a pump at the top of the newly created hole. The 
pump system consists of an electric motor driving a gear box that moves a lever. The lever 
pushes and pulls back and forth and moves a large rod up and down. The rod is attached to a 
large airtight plunger that creates suction. This suction is what draws up the oil from the depths 
of the newly created well. The crude oil located in the MENA region has a thin viscosity and so 
this system works exceptionally well. Oil in other areas of the world is much thicker and requires 
additional drilling and the use of steam pressure to thin the oil in the reservoir. This process is 
called enhanced oil recovery and is much more costly, making oil in the Middle East an even 
more profitable endeavor. Once the crude oil is out of the ground it is still not useable. It must 
first be shipped off to various oil refineries in order to produce the final product. A network of 
transport links, consisting of trucks, ships and pipes, is utilized to transport the oil to various 
refining plants and fossil fuel plants that are directly linked to the national power grid.48   
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In order to compare and contrast the systems for solar farms and oil fields, we must go to 
the material level for the properties of each form of energy, which are equally important to the 
structural relations that produce energy networks. As mentioned in the introduction, this analysis 
is guided by the work of the French anthropologist, Bruno Latour. In his renowned book, 
Reassembling the Social, he argues that social forces alone are too weak to account for anything 
like the durable and complex structures that amalgamate society.49 Within this description, the 
human and non-human must be given equal agency. Dismissing the agency of the non-human 
results in describing only part of the social factors that form a successful network.50 By following 
this logic, this analysis begins focused upon the material and then expands to the ideological 
underpinnings that are co-constructive of the networks that enable oil and solar energy to be 
produced. 
When each form of energy is investigated separately, there appears to be a great 
difference between the processes involved in the extraction of solar energy and oil. Foremost, 
there are many less stages that separate the initial ray of solar from the final use of that energy 
than the amount of time it takes for oil to initially form and the following technical procedures 
and transport required to finally consume it. This difference comes down to the material 
attributes of both forms of energy. Crude oil is a thick and heavily contaminated liquid that is 
only found in specific areas around the world. Secondly, where it is found, it is trapped beneath 
and between layers of stubborn rock, making oil difficult to find, extract and to make useable. 
Solar energy on the other hand, is a weightless interaction of highly energized photons that has 
no physical attributes as such. It is found no matter where you are on the surface of the Earth and 
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is available whenever the sun is shining. Once the energy is captured it can be immediately be 
used in a vast array of applications. 
Despite these material differences, the systems of energy described above are structurally 
quite similar. As the names suggest, a field and a farm are highly centralized areas of land that in 
this case have a singular purpose. The field or farm acts as a central hub of energy extraction and 
is processed by a large team of expertise that seek to create the most efficient yields. They both 
require considerable financial investment due to their scale and often encounter long delays 
before ever becoming efficient or profitable. This aspect represents the character of a planned 
economy that desires to create energy systems along the lines of the already established flows of 
power supply. 
In the Middle East, a similarity in their location is observable too. The majority of the 
largest oil reservoirs are located in desert regions of the Middle East and similarly the desert 
regions in the Middle East experience the highest levels of solar energy throughout the year, 
hence solar is often heralded as holding the key to a potential desert economy. In many aspects 
these similarities point to the ways that both forms of energy are produced through the same 
structural network, despite their material differences. Zooming out to larger structural relations, 
the solar fields of the Middle East face a similar issue of expertise that oil in the Middle East also 
once faced. The technology and expertise required to create these projects is relatively new and 
the knowledge production centers for this technology are not currently located within the MENA 
region.  
The expertise of oil was first produced in the US in the late 19th century. Oil rich nations 
like Saudi Arabia were in need of US oil companies to provide the technical knowhow in order 
to utilize their most profitable resource. Karl Twitchell was an American geologist who was 
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convinced there were significant oil deposits located in Saudi Arabia. He arrived in 1942 to start 
his scientific exploration of Saudi resources and began a close relationship with Saudi leadership. 
Utilizing funds from the American Standard Oil company, he began widespread expeditions 
across sparsely populated areas of the Saudi Kingdom.51 Returning from these trips he would 
inform the Saudi Government of his hopeful findings and how they may come to greatly benefit 
the kingdom. Throughout this process, Twitchell would pass on valuable data about water, 
agriculture and other natural resources, while doing so he would be providing them with a new 
set of terms and tools by which the Saudi government could understand their environment and 
how to manage it. The advice provided by early American experts in Saudi Arabia was not only 
taken into consideration but science itself was embraced and provided a means by which the 
leadership could justify their management of nature and society.52  
Jumping forward to 2017, the knowledge center for solar may be considered to be China. 
In 2016, China’s solar energy production more than doubled. The National Energy 
Administration (NEA) reported that by the end of the year, China’s solar capacity was 
approximately 77.42 gigawatts.53 This surpasses the previous leader in solar production, 
Germany. China has made many ambitious plans for renewable energy and its investment in this 
sector have shown no signs of losing momentum. It will therefore most likely be Chinese 
expertise that arrive in Saudi Arabia to create highly technological solar farms. This is already 
evident in the manufacturing plans of JA Solar a leading Chinese manufacturer of solar panels. 
They are reportedly “redesigning some panels for very hot, dry deserts and others for extreme 
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humidity.”54 This tailoring of technology will allow them to serve cost effective solutions to the 
developing markets of solar energy in countries like Saudi Arabia. There is not an inherent 
problem in acquiring expertise from foreign nations, but it reaffirms the similarities in the early 
structural development of oil and solar. The first connections to Saudi leadership made by 
American scientists set the stage for US oil companies to invest in Middle East oil and we will 
likely see large investments into Saudi Arabian solar from Chinese energy companies.   
To a potential investor it may seem promising that solar utilizes the successful structural 
network of already established energy systems, except this energy requires less stages in 
production and has the alluring quality of zero pollution. This is evident from the large sums of 
investment going towards 60 new solar field projects in Saudi Arabia as part of the Vision 2030 
national economic plan.55 Yet, by applying the same productive apparatus over solar energy 
production, the material characteristics of solar that make it unique are not fully utilized. In terms 
of a Latourian analysis, we can see how in this case the agency of solar is subverted and made to 
conform to the existing energy structure. For Latour this would represent an unsuccessful 
network, failing to provide equal agency to the material qualities of solar and the pressures of 
social forces or from the incumbent energy sector’s perspective, the amalgamation of social 
forces and the material qualities of oil create a successful network capable of suppressing other 
forms of energy.  
 
2. Points of control: Small scale solar sites 
Unlike oil, solar can be found everywhere, which means that a highly centralized 
structure is not required to produce solar energy. In fact, much of the success in the application 
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of solar panels has been from decentralized networks of solar panels installed on top of homes 
and commercial buildings. Entire neighborhoods have the opportunity to install solar panels on 
their roofs and completely remove their energy consumption from the national grid, whilst also 
supplying excess energy back into the grid. The early costs of solar made large investment 
projects the only viable option for solar production but the rapidly decreasing costs of solar cells 
has made the possibility for anyone to produce a productive amount of solar energy increasingly 
viable. This may present the disruptive element of solar for the power industry, but it is a 
problem they may have an answer to.  
In late 2017, the Saudi Government released its policies and regulations for decentralized, 
small scale solar sites, i.e. solar panels installed on top of homes. At first glance, this shows the 
Saudi Government’s openness to the possibility of decentralized energy production. Under 
further examination, these policies may in fact represent a consolidation of control over solar 
energy production. For the power industry, homeowners producing their own energy can pose a 
major dilemma to the balance of supply and demand meticulously calculated by power grid 
engineers. In Saudi Arabia you must connect your solar system to the national grid and any 
surplus of energy you produce is fed into the grid to be used elsewhere. A credit scheme has 
been adopted to reimburse consumers for their excess production, in which consumers receive 
energy credits they can use to redeem their contribution, resulting in potentially free electricity. 
This could be seen as incentive for consumers to invest in establishing their own solar systems, 
however, this is the only form of incentive consumers receive for their costly and time intensive 
investment.  
Setting up your own solar system in Saudi Arabia costs more than $10,000, and can go 
much higher depending on the level of energy production desired and the quality of components 
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used, not to mention maintenance fees.56 After one has chosen their solar contractor, sent in an 
application for a small scale solar site inquiry to the government, completed a distribution impact 
survey, paid a fluctuating application fee, received an application validation, applied for a 
municipal permit for building regulations, received design approval from the national electricity 
company, undergone an inspection by the national electricity company and installed a net 
metering system, one can finally begin to watch their hefty investment pay off.57 Unfortunately, 
it is unlikely one would see a return on their investment for decades. For energy credits will only 
compensate you for energy you don’t produce, if you have a highly efficient solar system you 
will most likely be feeding more energy into the grid than you will receive back. Saudi laws 
prohibit you from sharing any excess electricity among your community or allocating your 
surplus to any other home.58 This means that the most sensible financial decision would be to 
invest in a suboptimal solar system that is capable of producing the bare minimum of energy to 
offset the cost of energy consumed from the grid. This way the minimal costs for set up are 
incurred and the maximum benefit of free electricity is still received. In the credit system 
described here, the centralized structure of the traditional energy suppliers is maintained and the 
disruption caused by those financially able to establish solar systems is minimized. All energy is 
still connected to the national grid and all decisions related to small scale solar sites are at the 
discretion of the incumbent national power company. 
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3. The timeline of energy transitions: Solar in the context of energy history 
How do solar systems fit into the narrative of energy over the course of recent history? 
Up until 200 years ago, humans solely enjoyed the use of renewable forms of energy. Since then 
the human race has transferred its major energy sources from natural photosynthesis, animal and 
human labor, to coal and then to oil. Each change is referred to as an energy transition or 
sometimes an energy revolution. Timothy Mitchell, a political scientist, describes a timeline 
from the humble beginnings of energy to the braggadocios hegemonic role of oil in society today 
in his book Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil. He sets out the abilities to 
transform society that each new form of carbon enabled and stops short of the perceived 
upcoming transition to man-made renewable forms of energy.59 If he were to continue his 
exploration, he would likely move onto solar energy as the next fuel for civilization. 
Interestingly, solar energy could be perceived to derail the timeline he sets forward, as solar 
marks a return to the original energy source that our ancestors depended on throughout pre-
modern history. 
However, Mitchell is unlikely to agree with this romanticized view of the advent of solar 
technology. For Mitchell what allowed for oil to structurally challenge the pre-existing order of a 
coal based economy was the inherent material qualities that pertain to oil.60 Oil’s liquid state 
made it easily transportable in comparison to coal and the ability to mechanize its extraction 
meant less forms of manual labor were required to produce it. The concentrated locations of oil 
reservoirs then allowed for the establishment of highly centralized technical zones. He refers to a 
‘technical zone’ as a set of coordinated “regulations, calculative arrangements, infrastructures 
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and technical procedures that render certain objects or flows governable.”61 In terms of 
infrastructure, the development of solar farms only offers adjustments and minor improvements 
to the structures that oil allowed for. Solar energy can be easily transported via electrical wires, 
its extraction is an entirely mechanized process and the centralized form of solar farms offers the 
possibility for the same manageable ‘technical zone’. Despite solar energy’s climate neutral 
impact, solar farms don’t represent anything close to what we can consider a natural production 
of energy. The intense level of technological knowledge and management needed for solar farms 
is a vast abstraction from the organic process of photosynthesis. The solar farm is characterized 
by its ability to control and manage the energy flow from the sun. The fact that solar farms are 
exclusively funded and managed by large companies and governments only goes to reify the 
notion that it is the responsibility of a nation to exploit and control its resources.  
By viewing solar farms as a natural process that are an inevitable step towards progress, 
we lose focus of the current network of oil flows and instead wait in anticipation of an improved 
future. This could be understood as a pacifying ideology that disconnects oil and its far reaching 
branches, expecting that the narrative of progress and modernity will provide solace. 
 
4. Competing energy: Renewable energies dependency on the future of oil management 
 
Failure to consider the material and systemic differences between traditional energy and 
renewables will lead us to believe that the incumbent energy sector will only be broken once 
renewable energy has become “competitive” or cheaper to produce. However, this is clearly an 
error, as the incumbent sector enjoys a wealth of other revenues from downstream sectors, like 
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the petrochemical industry, producing various refined oils, plastics and other carbon based 
materials. The previous sections under this chapter discussed the technical procedures for solar 
and oil production, the material qualities of each and the historical context within which solar 
energy has arisen. These factors provide the basis on which this section will synthesize the 
perspective of an oil company in relation to the potential of renewable energies for systematic 
disruption. 
The traditional energy system is organized to be in constant parallel to the various 
streams of energy it produces. For instance, if Saudi Arabia removes one key element, such as 
the traditional power plant, then replaces it with a renewable energy source, there will be 
immediate effects to the upstream sector and the downstream sector. The previous source of 
energy for the power plant will need to find a new customer or it will no longer be in demand 
and in addition, the price of the previous energy source will be affected with further knock on 
effects to the economic feasibility of its transportation infrastructure. This disruption continues 
downstream to the transmission networks, which are individually tailored for each power plant 
location. It is very rare that renewable energy is produced in the same location as traditional 
energy, therefore the costly transmission structures would become superfluous. There are no 
studies that fully evaluate the costs of the entirety of the oil system and its various downstream 
industries for Saudi Arabia. While we can identify the profits made by oil companies or the oil 
industry, we are not able to fully grasp every way in which oil has seeped into industries that are 
seemingly detached from oil companies, but are still very much dependent upon them. 
Hence, it is inaccurate to assume that traditional energy companies are considering the 
transition to renewable energies by examining the costs of production for renewable energies. An 
energy company like Aramco is instead using a different criteria, in which the system costs 
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become decisive. The byproducts generated by the system that produces oil, such as lubricants, 
fertilizers and various plastics are entire industries in themselves and once a location for 
processing these byproducts is removed, it simply becomes waste. The knock on effects within 
this chain of production and consumption are so powerful that the power companies become 
prisoners of their own structures. They struggle to implement renewable energies without 
majorly disrupting their economic rationality. Thus, all renewable energy movements should be 
limited and designed to minimize any negative impact on their established system. In this 
process renewable energies become a cover or a minor adjustment. The biggest threat to the 
incumbent sector often comes from third parties, where technologies and development can be 
made outside of their control. Consequently, their hand is forced and in order to maintain control 
they must be active in the field of renewable energy as not to be left behind. However, all their 
pursuits must be deemed compatible with their own established system.  
This is why large scale solar sites are deemed acceptable, they pose minor changes to the 
structure of energy flows and they allow for the same level of control that the incumbent sector 
have over traditional energy supplies. Also, steps toward nuclear energy are made within long-
term time frames and again pose little threat to their element of control. Even small scale solar 
sites are made to conform by protecting the ways in which electricity can be transmitted and by 
retaining ownership of all energy produced. From the perspective of the incumbent energy sector 
a rapid energy transition appears impossible, and so it is, unless they are prepared to destroy their 
own capital.  
 
5. Temporal dilemma: Technology’s contribution to the longevity of oil 
 
When confronted by the promises of renewable energies they seem inevitable, as oil is a 
finite resource. There always will be a finite amount of oil, so why should we care about the 
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efforts of the incumbent energy sector, when it will clearly all be in vain? While the amount of 
oil the world can extract is limited, this has never meant there is a scarcity of it. Quite the 
contrary, many issues arise out of the abundance of oil that’s contained in large reservoirs around 
the world. Saudi Arabia alone holds an estimated 268 billion barrels of oil, which according to 
OPEC’s predictions, would provide the nation with 70 years of continuous production at the 
current rate of extraction.62 These figures are a major source of contention among analysts as 
British Petroleum (BP) has announced that global oil reserves “would be sufficient to meet 50.6 
years of global production at 2016 levels”.63 Much of this disparity comes from the questioned 
transparency of companies’ proven oil reserves and the methods for predicting future oil 
discoveries. Questions arise as to why Saudi Arabia may want to embellish their figures and how 
such figures are initially reached. Answering these difficult questions would require knowledge 
and insight into the highest echelons of the Saudi Government that academic literature and 
external research can’t provide. While we cannot truly determine the validity of these figures, 
these are the same figures used by governments, NGOs and other institutions and represent the 
public understanding of the state of oil production. 
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Fig.1 Saudi Arabia crude oil production from 1970-2016. “Saudi Arabia Crude Oil Production.,” Trading 
Economics, accessed 13 March, 2018. https://tradingeconomics.com/saudi-arabia/crude-oil-production?embed. 
 
Be that as it may, this essay assumes that the Saudi productive capacity for oil is the 
second largest in the world and that it has held its positions as one of the world’s top oil 
producers since the 1970s, excluding drops in production throughout the 80s. Looking at fig.1, if 
we exclude the data from the 1979 global oil crisis and its resulting price shocks, we can see that 
Saudi Arabia has been able to consistently produce between 8000-10000 million barrels per day. 
Even if we take into consideration the plummet in production during the 80s, the quick recovery 
to the average in 1989 is exemplary of Saudi Arabia’s continuous ability to produce oil at a 
considerably high rate.  
Despite Saudi Arabia’s large capacity for oil production, the oil industry itself is 
characterized by its historic fluctuations and competitive networks of supply. Oil unlike its 
predecessor, coal, is fluid and flexible, which presents unique problems for managing its 
production and distribution networks. Oil’s fluid nature meant that it was easily transportable in 
large quantities across vast distances, which contrasts bulky and heavy coal. For oil companies in 
the early days of oil production, it meant that they were always vulnerable to the possibility of 
cheaper oil being produced somewhere out of their control. Timothy Mitchell argues that the oil 
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companies’ response the issue of global competition was to create new regulatory policies and 
employ restrictive intervention.64 He describes what emerged as a political and technical 
apparatus: A set of coordinated regulations, meticulous calculations, infrastructures and technical 
expertise coalescing into a highly governable and sustainable flow of energy. The purpose of this 
apparatus is to sustain a manufactured system of limited supply. This is a process that to an 
extent disregards the quantifiably finite amount of oil and instead creates the conditions 
necessary to retain the profitability of oil. 
In Saudi Arabia this apparatus began to emerge at the end of the Second World War in 
which US oil companies considerably reduced or terminated the production of oil throughout the 
Middle East. WWII acted as an unofficial regulatory factor, by restricting the flows of oil within 
the global market and set the stage for official restrictions to be produced. Ibn Saud 1932-1953, 
the founder of Saudi Arabia, dissatisfied with the loss of revenue throughout WWII, implored the 
US to compensate the Saudi Monarchy. The threat to the US if they didn’t agree would be 
devastating to their domestic oil production, as Saudi Arabia had the ability to dump cheap oil 
into the market. This would make oil production less profitable and could potentially force many 
nations to produce oil at a loss. The US Government responded with the Lend Lease Bill of 
1941. As part of the Lend Lease bill, Washington approved payments in the form of aid and 
military packages to Saudi Arabia for not producing oil.65 Mitchell points to this arrangement as 
the start of “Saudi collaboration in restricting the flow of oil… As though it were a system for 
‘protecting’ the oil against others.”66 This would mean that Saudi Arabia would not exhaust their 
resources and that none of the US’s adversaries would be able to benefit from a potential bargain 
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on price per barrel. In a game theory fashion, the Lend Lease Bill solution allowed for the US 
and Saudi Arabia to engage in tacit collusion, an agreed upon strategy without explicitly stating 
it. From then on, Saudi Arabia’s oil production would be regulated, restricted and partly funded 
by the security interests of the US. It must be noted, in the following decade many further 
constraints would be built upon bill but the Lend Lease bill of 1941 is indicative of the 
regulations implemented to ensure production is agreeably sustained. 
The second method of maintaining oil’s manufactured scarcity, or in other words oil’s 
profitability, was to ensure a higher and sustained demand for it. To explain this, Mitchell points 
to the emergence of carbon-heavy lifestyles in the western world. He describes how the US 
focused on producing vehicles with V8 engines opposed to the more reliant V2 and V4 European 
engineered engines. The new V8 engines became the “dream of every middle-class family.” 
Even today, one can look at the latest car magazines and observe the prowess afforded to 
American muscle cars and the apparent luxury of a 4x4 SUV. Mitchell argues that these gas 
guzzling vehicles helped to form desirable carbon-heavy American lifestyles that in light of new 
production regulations in the Middle East “would help the oil companies keep oil scarce enough 
to allow their profits to thrive.” 67 
It is not clear whether there is a causal relationship between the creation of new carbon-
heavy lifestyles and the need to manufacture oil scarcity. However, it is undeniable that the US 
has normalized their extraordinary level of oil consumption. Whether it be the in the car industry 
or the explosion of domestic electrical appliances, such as refrigerators, food processors and 
washing machines, everyday middle-class life became fixated on one’s engagement with a 
specific mode of energy consumption. Ultimately, oil companies could be rest assured that the 
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continuous demand for oil would satisfy their desired capacity for oil production. In this 
framework oil has the appearance of only just meeting global demand or at times being scarce, 
yet in reality the oil market is benefiting from regulations and policies created to restrain and 
limit the amount of oil available.  
The process of creating a limited supply of oil was operating in an isolated market until 
recently. The advent of pragmatic renewable energies provides an alternative and therefore the 
monopolistic manipulations of price and supply for oil become less and less effective. However, 
renewable energies may not simply abolish the status quo, instead they may have the ability to 
increase the longevity of the incumbent energy sector. Counterintuitively, renewable energies 
now have the potential to become a new instrument under the control of the incumbent energy 
sector, giving them the ability to restrain and limit the amount of oil available for decades to 
come.  
The Kingdom’s consumption of its own oil production has steadily been increasing and it 
currently consumes approximately one quarter of its own production every year.68 This means 
that Saudi Arabia consumes more oil than a heavily industrialized nation like Germany, with 
over triple the population and an economy five times larger. Citigroup’s analyst, Heidy Rehman 
made the statement in 2012 that “As a result of its subsidies we calculate 'lost' oil and gas 
revenues to Saudi Arabia in 2011 to be over $80 billion,” essentially stating that Saudi Arabia’s 
profit margin is drastically diminished by their own consumption rates. 69 If it were possible to 
wean the Kingdom’s population off of oil and instead provide them with renewable energies for 
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domestic consumption, the energy sector would be presented with a number of economic 
opportunities.  
Firstly, if domestic oil consumption can be offset, there will be more oil available for 
export, a market in which Saudi Arabia does not have to bear the burden of subsidies. They will 
be able to gain a larger amount of oil revenues by simply selling their commodity elsewhere. 
However, there are various risks involved in increasing the amount of oil exported, for example, 
if Aramco were to suddenly redirect all the oil produced for the domestic market to the 
international market they would flood the global market and cause the price of oil to plummet. 
Alternatively, they could simply reduce production rates and maintain their current level for oil 
exports. However, the benefit in this scenario is that every year they are able to hold onto one 
quarter of their own supply, meaning every four years they gain a year of producing oil at the 
current rate in the future. Additionally, they will always have a surplus to fall back on if the 
market dynamics change and require them to export oil at a higher rate. In this situation not only 
are they able to safely maintain oil exports, but also maintain a surplus in the event of increased 
global demand for oil.  
While Saudi Arabia oil production has traditionally relied on the energy consumption in 
the West, specifically the US, growth in demand for fossil fuels is largely coming from 
developing nations in the East, specifically China and India. This is a steadily growing market, 
one that Saudi Arabia is fully capable of supplying. The International Energy Agency, an 
autonomous intergovernmental organization established in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, 
reports that, “Global energy needs will rise more slowly than in the past but still expand by 30% 
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between today and 2040. This is the equivalent of adding another China and India to today’s 
global demand.”70  
As one of the largest energy consumers, China’s energy choices will play a huge role in 
determining global trends, and have the potential to influence a faster clean energy transition. 
China’s energy development, technology exports and global investment provide a fundamental 
determinant of momentum towards a low-carbon energy transition. The IEA reports, “One-third 
of the world’s new wind power and solar PV is installed in China in the New Policies Scenario, 
and China also accounts for more than 40% of global investment in electric vehicles (EVs).” 
While China’s array of investments into clean energies is a promising move away from fossil 
fuel dependency, it cannot be ignored that China is predicted to overtake the United States as the 
largest oil consumer around 2030.71 It is this growing market that Saudi Arabia will be fully able 
to exploit, provided they can maintain the profitability of their oil exports and ensure there is 
continuous production of oil for the decades to come. 
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Chapter III: Social Energy Transition 
 
1. Political monarchy: Why Saudi Arabia can choose energy transition 
 
Saudi Arabian politics operates within the context of a totalitarian monarchy, in which 
the King is both the head of state and government. The majority of decisions are made through 
consultation among the senior leadership of the royal family and the religious establishment. 
Political activities outside of the royal family are considered to be very limited. Recent internal 
disputes among the royal family have led to a considerable consolidation of power in the hands 
of Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. He was a relatively insignificant figure until in June 
2017 he was elevated to the position of crown prince, replacing his cousin Mohammed bin 
Nayef.72 The most prominent exercise of his power was seen in early November 2017, when the 
world saw Saudi princes, politicians and businessmen rounded up, arrested and detained at the 
Ritz-Carlton hotel in Riyadh, as mentioned in chapter 1. It is difficult to gauge whether this event 
was a true act of intolerance for internal corruption or a scheme to fill the state coffers. Saudi 
Attorney General Saud al-Mojeb announced that the campaign had brought in more than $106 
billion. This constituted financial settlements, including seized real estate assets, commercial 
entities and securities and cash from the detainees themselves in exchange for their freedom.73 
While we can speculate the reasons behind this event, it is clear that the Crown Prince has 
accumulated a strong hold on power within the nation.  
As the reformer behind the Vision 2030 program, he is expected to shape the nation for 
decades to come by primarily shifting the economy away from its oil addiction. His vision is 
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unlikely to face obstruction, as those who might have contested his decisions are bound to be 
fearful of retribution. The extent to which Vision 2030’s goals are realized and whether or not 
they impact climate change issues is reliant on the leadership of the Crown Prince. While we 
may presume the Crown Prince is unlikely to significantly compromise revenues produced from 
the exportation of oil, this turn of events has taken much of the world by surprise. We only have 
to look back ten years to see Saudi Arabia’s pattern of obstruction towards any policy limiting 
their abilities to export oil.  
Joanna Depledge is an Associate at the Centre of International Studies, at Cambridge 
University (UK). She is the co-author of The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to 
Rules, Institutions and Procedures and author of The Organization of Global Negotiations: 
Constructing the Climate Change Regime. Her experience as the UN Climate Change Secretariat 
has provided her with important insights into the relationship between nations and climate 
change. Written ten years ago, her article, “Striving for No: Saudi Arabia in the Climate Change 
Regime” published in MIT’s Global Environmental Politics Journal, reviewed Saudi Arabia’s 
perspective and actions against the rising climate change movement. The article was written with 
much urgency, as in one year’s time the highly anticipated Copenhagen conference was set to 
take place. She outlines the various obstructionist tactics of the Saudi leadership: Parallel 
progress policies74, repetition and propagation, seeking postponement and delays, refusing to 
negotiate, holding out on consensus and exploiting their position as the G-77 coordinator. She 
concludes that Saudi Arabia’s position has been made clear time and time again to be intently 
                                               
74 Parallel progress policies are policies that require advancements to be made in one area under the conditions 
advancements are made in another.  In 2007, Saudi Arabia warned that, if developed countries did not agree to its 
demands on related to the adverse effects of limiting fossil fuel emissions, this “could result in issues of importance 
to certain other parties being blocked too”. A comment made at the 2007 Vienna climate change talks by the Saudi 
delegation.     
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obstructionist to climate change objectives. In her last sentence she summarizes that “for now, 
any signs of a softening in the Saudi negotiating position remained well hidden.”75  
 If, as Depledge claims, Saudi Arabia has been directly impeding the progress of climate 
change objectives, then Vision 2030’s and the Saudi INDC goals point to a significant decision 
made in just the last ten years to work more cooperatively within the climate change discourse. A 
decision that likely underwent much deliberation, as now they must slowly retreat from their 
historically hostile approach. Their rapid change of heart over the last ten years suggests the 
protections they deemed essential are not matched by the agency of Saudi leadership. While 
some barriers are plausible concerns for Saudi Arabia, like the effects of limiting oil production, 
their attitude towards these barriers is much more malleable than their past position conveyed.   
 
2. Global aspirations: Saudi Arabia’s energy position between China and the US 
 
As opportunities for investment in solar power open up in Saudi Arabia, it’s resources 
and knowledge from China that seem most promising for the emerging market. Saudi Arabia and 
China have a growing strategic relationship and share some common interests in relation to the 
future of energy supply and demand. Saudi Arabia was historically one of a few nations to 
recognize and have diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan), however these 
diplomatic ties ended in the early 90s and has, to an extent,76 eliminated this point of contention 
between China and Saudi Arabia. China’s relationship to Taiwan is a tense political conflict, 
however it appears Saudi Arabia’s historical relationship to Taiwan has become superseded by 
energy trade between Saudi Arabia and China.77 Developments in Saudi Arabia, one of the 
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76 Saudi Arabia and the ROC still maintain economic representative offices and trade relations. 
77 Muhamad Olimat, China and the Middle East: from silk road to Arab spring (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 106. 
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world’s largest oil producer, will have major implications for China, the world’s largest oil 
importer. As China’s energy demands rapidly increase, their reliance on foreign imported oil will 
make Saudi Arabia an essential partner for years to come.  
 Indicative of this tightening relationship, Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud 
visited China in January 2006, his first official state visit to another country.78 The primary focus 
of this trip was to foster a cooperative spirit between the two nations in relation to oil, gas and 
mineral trade. Just three months later, President Hu Jintao made his first state visit to Saudi 
Arabia and this marked the first time China and the Arab world had made such significant high-
profile exchanges within such short period of time.79 This only reinforces the importance both 
sides saw of strengthening their energy relationship. These high profile state visits have become 
increasingly common. In January 2017, China’s president Xi Jingping visited Saudi Arabia and 
stated hopefully he wants to lift "co-operation in various fields to a new level."80 In March 2017 
this manifested itself, as present King Salman oversaw the signing of deals worth $65 billion 
dollars during his visit to Beijing. The deals included the cooperation of the Saudi state oil 
company, Aramco and China North Industries Group Corp (Norinco) on the construction of oil 
and chemical refinery plants in China.81  
 Aside from oil trade, Saudi Arabia and China may also greatly benefit one and other by 
pursuing their mutual interests in solar power. China is the world’s largest producer of solar 
energy and Saudi Arabia’s geographical position allows them to enjoy a comparative advantage 
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in solar production. As stated in chapter 2, section 5, Saudi Arabia’s solar production could 
dramatically reduce the Kingdom’s domestic oil consumption, open up oil resources for 
international export and lower global oil prices. Cooperation in the solar energy field could see 
China secure foreign oil imports and support the emergence of a large solar industry in Saudi 
Arabia.   
Perhaps even more importantly, developments in Saudi Arabia as part of Vision 2030 
will have rippling effects throughout the Islamic world. Saudi Arabia is home to Mecca, Medina 
and other holy sites, places of great religious and spiritual importance for the approximately 1.6 
billion Muslim individuals in the world. Muslims are projected to make up 26.4% of the global 
population by 2030, approximately 2.2 billion individuals.82 China’s ever expanding global 
influence and interaction will likely lead to further and deeper relations with Muslim-majority 
societies in Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Iran and others. China’s future relations with these 
nations and Muslim-majority societies will likely be influenced and shaped by their growing 
relationship with Saudi Arabia.    
These recent developments display a directional change in outlook for Saudi Arabia, a 
nation often noted for its relationship to the US and more generally, the West. The relationship 
between the US and Saudi Arabia is, perhaps, an unexpected one. On the one hand, Saudi Arabia 
is an extremely conservative, Islamic, totalitarian monarchy. On the other, the US is a liberal, 
secular, constitutional republic. Despite this, the two countries have been allies since diplomatic 
relations were officially established in 1933.83 The most common exchanges between the two 
nations often relate to regional security in the Middle East and the trade of oil and arms.  
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This relationship has never been short of tension. Most notably, the US’s outrage over the 
alleged role of Saudi Arabia in the September 11th, 2001, terror attacks on New York City’s 
World Trade Center.84 In the aftermath Saudi Arabia’s image was tarnished within the U.S. 
political discourse and US media.85 In September 2016, the US Congress passed the Justice 
Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act that would allow relatives of victims of the September 11 
attacks to sue Saudi Arabia for its government's alleged role in the attacks.86  
 This tension points to the major disparity between the two countries, but also the relative 
small effect this has on the deals between the two governments that continue to be signed. Most 
recently, US President Donald Trump authorized $110B in arms deals with Saudi Arabia, worth 
$300B over a ten-year period, signed on the 20 May 2017.87 The deal includes the use of US 
military personnel to train Saudi forces and engage in close co-operation with the Saudi Arabian 
military. On the other side, Saudi Arabia continues to satisfy the US’s demand for imported oil.  
In regards to renewable energies, the US hasn’t shown any major interest. The US 
Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of International Affairs has a strong relationship with 
Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Energy, Industry and Minerals, supported by an annual Bilateral 
Energy Dialogue (BED). BED, according to the DOE, “provides an opportunity to address issues 
                                               
84 While the US has made it possible for 9/11 victims to legally sue Saudi Arabia (see footnote: 60), the publication 
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of mutual interest… an opportunity to exchange information on oil and natural gas outlooks, 
electricity development plans and potential nuclear power development.”88 It would seem the 
scope of this energy relationship does not contain the development of renewable energies, but 
rather entails discussions of maintaining the status quo of oil trade. 
It appears the rise of renewable energy production in Saudi Arabia will have a minimal 
effect on US - Saudi Arabian relations, however, China and Saudi Arabia are quickly positioning 
themselves to work together in regards to the future of energy production in their respective 
countries. While the US first sent its scientists to Saudi Arabia to find oil and following this US 
oil companies acquired the ownership of said oil, an arguably exploitative relationship, China’s 
involvement in Saudi Arabia’s solar production is less likely to result in Chinese energy 
companies establishing themselves in Saudi Arabia. Instead, it is more probable that China and 
Saudi Arabia’s common interests in solar and oil will foster a more intimate and cooperative 
relationship. This is in line with the Vision 2030 foreword made by Crown Prince Mohammed 
Salman, in which he states that the third pillar of his vision is to transform Saudi Arabia’s unique 
geographical location into a global hub connecting three continents. The continuation of US-
Saudi relations and the creation of strong Chinese-Saudi relations will significantly enable the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to become “an epicenter of trade and the gateway to the world.”89  
 
3. Labor without fossil fuels: Saudi Arabian labor challenges in tandem with economic change 
 Saudi Arabia first experienced a high influx of foreign workers after oil was discovered 
in the late 1930s. These foreign workers were primarily Arab and Western technical and 
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professional personnel, however, foreign labor since then has been substantially composed of 
agricultural, cleaning and domestic services workers from Southeast Asia. According to a G20 
Labor Market Report published by Saudi Arabia in 2016, 53% of their total workforce is 
composed of foreign labor. This percentage is much higher for the private sector, where 89% of 
employees are foreign workers.90 In tandem with Saudi Arabia’s planned economic reforms, the 
nation has launched a voluntary policy called Nitaqat (تاقاطن), or as it is commonly referred to 
“Saudization”. Since September 2011, this policy has focused on three main goals: “1. Increase 
employment for Saudi nationals across all sectors of the domestic economy. 2. Reduce and 
reverse over-reliance on foreign workers. 3. Recapture and reinvest income which otherwise 
would have flowed overseas as remittances to foreign worker home countries.”91 
 This policy has the potential to cause major disruptions across many sectors of the Saudi 
economy. Robert Looney, a distinguished scholar of Middle East economies published an essay 
on the compatibility of economic reforms and the Saudization policy in Strategic Insights, a 
monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary Conflict. In his essay, 
“Saudization and Sound Economic Reforms: Are the Two Compatible?”, he states that, as of 
now, it is too early to gauge the lasting impacts of Saudization on the economy. The first result 
he anticipates is that “Saudization will reduce their competitiveness and for that reason may 
decide to leave the Kingdom for a more business-friendly environment.”92 This is not a new 
trend for Saudi Arabia, as can be seen in a report in World Markets Analysis from 2003, which 
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stated that 2,500 Saudi companies planned to establish themselves in Dubai, UAE, instead of in 
the Kingdom.93  
 Secondly, he expects that health and safety within the private sector will improve 
drastically in order to entice the 44% of the population under the age of 24 that make up the 
highest levels of unemployment for the nation. Looney goes on to identify to compounding 
problems that contribute to this situation. One aspect is the lack of a robust education system, 
which has failed to encourage the acquisition of technical skills for Saudi youth. The other factor 
is that perceptions of what are considered menial jobs, often with low pay and poor working 
conditions that are refused by Saudi graduates and further create dependency on foreign workers 
who are less discriminating against less favorable work conditions.94 Both the shortage in 
technical education and Saudi youth’s perception of work conditions in technical industries 
restrict and reduce the potential pool of workers in the nation.  
By providing vocational training, encouraging the creation of trainee programs and 
internships, awarding scholarships and reforming school curricula, Saudi Arabia will be able to 
increase their supply of technical skills and expertise among potential national workers. 
However, this only tackles one aspect of the problem. If Saudization targets are to be met in 
more hazardous and labor intensive sectors, most significantly construction, then drastic 
improvements are needed in health and safety conditions to attract Saudi nationals. Saudi 
Arabia’s rapid urban developments have been made possible to a large degree by the use of 
cheap foreign labor and plans for new cities and industrial complexes are showing no signs of 
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slowing down. Emerging out of Vision 2030, a new so called mega city, NEOM95, was 
announced by the Crown Prince on October 24, 2017.96 This is planned to be an even larger 
project than the King Abdullah Economic City announced in 2005, a project that is still yet to be 
completed. While the plans and construction deadlines are unclear for NEOM, the question still 
remains, is Saudi Arabia is willing to improve wages and working conditions in the construction 
sector to entice Saudi nationals, or will progress in this area be sacrificed in order to satisfy the 
Kingdoms insatiable appetite for new urban and economic centers? 
While Looney comments on young Saudi nationals’ unfavorable perception of the 
construction and oil and gas sectors of Saudi Arabia, he does not comment on perceptions of the 
emerging renewable energy sector. While similar amounts of labor are required for oil field 
operations on a solar farm project, we can assume that construction of solar sites subjects 
workers to less hazardous conditions and their operation is certainly less perilous. Construction 
of solar farms requires less work with large and heavy industrial metal components like oil rigs 
and maintenance workers don’t have the chance of being exposed to flammable and dangerous 
liquids like oil or have to put up with the unpleasant odor of hydrogen sulfide gas that emanates 
from crude oil. It would seem plausible that an occupation working on a solar farm would be 
more appealing on this basis and so renewable energy jobs may be an increasingly attractive 
proposition for Saudi youth. All of this is subject to the rate at which Saudi Arabia intends to 
increase its renewable energy production, as Looney remarks, Saudi Arabia’s economic growth 
will likely be disrupted by the aims of Saudization. Arguably, supplying the demand for 
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technical expertise in the renewable energy sector will be more challenging in certain aspects 
than increasing Saudi national employment in the incumbent energy sector. While knowledge 
and techniques for work in the oil sector have been well developed in Saudi Arabia, the 
renewable energy sector and its demands are relatively new. Saudi Arabia will need to rapidly 
develop new knowledge centers to create a viable Saudi national workforce for this sector if they 
are not to depend heavily on foreign contractors and expertise.  
Robert Looney concludes that Saudization does not have to be incompatible with the 
Kingdom’s economic development plans. Most notably, he remarks that the benefits of reducing 
the wages remitted by foreign labor, roughly $155 billion dollars over the last ten years, will 
counteract much of the potential loss in economic productivity.97 This conclusion should be 
taken with a healthy dose of skepticism, as Looney’s essay omits a discussion of gender 
inequalities, a factor that significantly contributes to unemployment in the nation. According to 
Saudi’s G20 Labor Market Report, the unemployment rate among women is 21.8 percent for all 
women, and 32.8 percent for Saudi nationals, a trend found among most other G20 nations.98  
While reforms in the Saudi educational system tackle the content of the curricula, what is 
deemed an appropriate occupation for a woman is engrained at the highest and lowest strata of 
Saudi society. Saudi Arabia states in the G20 Labor Market Report that “inspiring and training 
youth and increasing female participation are essential for a young and rapidly growing nation to 
achieve sustainable economic success.”99 However, increasing female participation in the sector 
of emerging technologies is not a problem faced by Saudi Arabia alone. A recent report from law 
firm Fenwick & West LLP shows that women hold just 11% of executive positions at Silicon 
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Valley, California companies. The report also says only 9% of executive officers in Silicon 
Valley are women.100 This shows that while Saudi Arabia’s gender inequality problems may be 
more pervasive than developed nations in general, the lack of female representation within 
emerging technologies is not specific to Saudi Arabia, but rather is a more common trend found 
around the globe. 
However, outside of the emerging technology industries, legislative, social, educational, 
and occupational constraints further prevent women from fully participating in the Saudi labor 
market. In September 2017, Saudi women were given the right to obtain a driver’s license and 
this was still met by a considerable public backlash.101 In February 2018, the Saudi General 
Directorate of Passports said it received 107,000 applications after advertising 140 jobs for 
women at airports and border crossings.102 This shows the relative shortage of opportunities for 
women in relation to the number of women who are willing to work. The issue clearly does not 
lie in lack of willingness on the behalf of unemployed Saudi women, but rather is a symptom of 
larger systematic constraints on women. For Saudization to include both men and women, the 
policy’s scope of impact will need to be widened to touch on the gender inequalities pervasive in 
Saudi institutions and culture. Until then, Saudi women’s contribution to the national level of 
unemployment will continue to be offset with foreign workers. However, even if these problems 
of inequality are drastically reduced through government incentives and systematic change on 
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the institutional level, the lack of female representation in the emerging technology sectors will 
remain a global issue. 
 Lastly, in Looney’s discussion of Saudization and within the policy itself, there is a lack 
of consideration for the perspectives of foreign workers, especially low-skilled laborers. 
Investigative journalists and labor rights organizations have revealed that low-skilled foreign 
workers are often unable to leave Saudi Arabia. The Council of Ministers first banned employers 
from keeping foreign workers’ passports seven years ago, however, the response has been 
slow.103 Many foreign workers find themselves in debt from making the expensive flight to 
Saudi Arabia and are unable to improve their financial situation as they receive low wages and 
due to their vulnerability, in some instances, no wage at all. While at a glance, Saudi Arabia 
mediates disputes and alleged abuses of foreign labor, the majority of results in these cases are 
that the worker is sent home and the issue is left inadequately investigated.104  
Saudization may aim to reduce dependency on foreign labor, however, much uncertainty 
surrounds the future of the current foreign workers in Saudi Arabia. It is still yet to been seen 
how willing the Saudi government is to sacrifice their planned rate of economic development for 
the aims of Saudization. Although, if Saudization is truly effective, the demand for foreign 
workers will be reduced and we may expect to see mass deportations. If this were the case, the 
loss of remittances sent to foreign workers’ home countries would reduce the amount of money 
circulating within the home nation’s economy. In addition to this, the workers who return will 
increase the home nation’s level of unemployment in an instant. In 2016, more than 2,500 Indian 
workers lost their jobs in Saudi Arabia and were stranded in labor camps without access to food 
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and clean water. With no signs of the Saudi authorities addressing the matter, India evacuated 
thousands of Indian workers. In this case, not only did India loose the benefits of remittances 
sent home and receive many unemployed citizens, but also India’s government utilized their own 
resources in order to counteract the lack of support afforded to foreign workers in Saudi 
Arabia.105  
 
 
4. Reorienting the ‘threat’ of climate change: Why energy transition is an opportunity for Saudi 
Arabia 
  
The power supply system in Saudi Arabia is entirely based upon conventional energy, 
meaning the Saudi business management sector sees any energy problem from the perspective of 
the incumbent energy sector. When the incumbent sector defines something as cost-effective, 
efficient or viable, their assignment of meaning is generally accepted within and even outside of 
the industry. Their dominative role can be perceived as near omnipotent and has led to the stark 
division of energy providers and energy consumers, whilst an intimate relationship exists 
between Saudi Aramco and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s government. These entrenched and 
systematized developments make it difficult for Saudi Arabia to perceive the opportunities that 
energy transition may open up to them. The acceptance of renewable energies has the potential to 
cause fundamental qualitative changes with the Saudi economy and they may never have to deal 
with the traditional restrictions and consequences of traditional energy growth.  
Saudi Arabia’s government must invest in renewable energies if they desire for their 
economy to benefit from the rise of economic synergies between renewables, new products and 
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their possible applications. The most prominent example at this present time is changes occurring 
in the automotive industry. Car designers and manufacturers appear to be breaking their once 
strong alliance with fossil fuels and are now going electric.106 While this essay does argue that 
oil, as a result of particular forms of renewable energies, will see its longevity increased, any 
price reductions seen for oil will be only in the short-term. Fossil fuels will inevitably become 
more expensive as their supply decreases, so if the automotive industry wants consumers to be 
able to afford the running of a car, they must create and capture a market for electric vehicles. 
Hermann Scheer, a remarkable and renowned contributor to climate change objectives argues 
that “the electric car is the driving belt of energy change.”107 Similarly, Timothy Mitchell 
identifies the fossil fuel engine as a major cause of exponential increase in the demand for oil, in 
the same respect, the electric vehicle will bring about an exponential increase in demand for 
renewables. Much of the innovation and increased demand of batteries will likely come from 
developments in electric vehicles, a further effect of the automotive industry on energy 
transition. As electric vehicles become affordable for the masses, the costs of mass production 
will begin to fall quickly and soon electric vehicle manufacturers will be able to undercut the 
prices of all traditional energy fueled vehicles. 
 In Vision 2030, we see the first signs of Saudi Arabia preparing for the “time after”, 
when their energy reserves are finally exhausted. Yet, from investigating the relationship 
between emerging renewable energy production sites like the solar farm and the continuous 
production of oil, we see how Saudi Arabia’s current economic interests motivate them to delay 
energy transition for as long as possible - an objective shared by Saudi Aramco. However, 
                                               
106 For information on the automotive industry’s newfound alliance with electric vehicles and renewable 
technologies see David A. Kirsch, The electric vehicle and the burden of history (Rutgers University Press, 2000). 
107 Hermann Scheer, The Energy Imperative: 100 percent renewable now, 133. 
67 
 
among developing nations, Saudi Arabia may have the greatest financial space to maneuver in 
regards to renewable energy investment. If Saudi Arabia is able to offset its domestic oil 
consumption with renewables, there will still come a day when exporting oil is no longer a viable 
crutch to support the Kingdom. It is yet to be seen whether or not Saudi Arabia desires to 
continue its role as a global energy exporter after the era of oil and begin seriously investing in 
renewables for the future.  
 This all points to the great irony of energy transition in the 21st century. While Saudi 
Arabia was never formally colonized like many or its neighbors, it was subject to the colonial 
manipulation and influence of the British and Americans throughout the 20th century. However, 
now the roles are seemingly reversed. It is the importing countries that are increasingly 
dependent upon the extracting countries. Joint solidarity in the form of OPEC, displays a 
growing confidence among exporting nations and now, we regularly see former colonial powers 
making high-profile visits to these nations in order to secure their energy demands. Saudi 
Arabia’s position as a holder of global energy supplies has enabled its government to become a 
proactive member of the global political stage.  
If these energy exporting nations wish to retain the power afforded to them by their 
energy resources, they will need to be on the forefront of the next dominant form of energy. This 
would mean a country like Saudi Arabia will need to heavily invest in an advanced range of 
renewable energy investments before the last stages of the traditional energy system arrive. If 
Saudi Arabia waits for traditional energy supplies to run dry, they may miss the opportunity for 
retaining their position as a global exporter of energy presented by renewable energies.  
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Conclusion 
This project has examined how Saudi Arabia’s perspective on tackling climate change 
and renewable energies has become increasingly positive since just a decade ago. However, we 
have seen why this may not be a result of a concern for the amount CO2 in the atmosphere nor 
for the desire of creating a 100% renewable energy society. The current prospect for solar energy 
in Saudi Arabia is that it will be used to supplement the countries overwhelming consumption of 
their own oil resources and that the oil freed up by this will be globally exported in order to 
profit the national coffers. No longer will they suffer the burden of state subsidized energy and 
will instead be able to not only increase their power as an oil exporting nation, but they will 
further be able to sustain their oil resources throughout this century.  Few would argue that 
renewable energies will not become the future fuel that powers the world, however, advocates of 
renewable energies are misguided when they portray them as being in competition with fossil 
fuels. Until major systematic transformations occur that can break the incumbent energy sector’s 
tight grasp of their energy monopoly, renewable energies will remain an alternative, a 
supplement and a minor adjustment.  
 I opened this project with an anecdote about Peter Josten and his Senior Project from 
1947, in which he made claims about the future of energy over the next century. This proved to 
be a perilous endeavor. Finishing this project, I am highly aware of how similar my situation is 
to his. As of now, there is considerable global attention being given to the risks presented by 
climate change and we can expect the mission of sustainable development to continue into the 
foreseeable future. However, much has changed during the course of writing this Senior Project. 
This project has had to tackle the problem of writing a story that hasn’t been fully told and has 
been subject to the changes of daily headlines. While Peter Josten arguably had a more difficult 
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experience finding sources of information, I have been challenged by my limited access to the 
inner workings of the Saudi Arabian government. I am aware that the policies published by the 
Saudi Arabian government may not fully reflect their intent, but my aim remained to ‘listen’ to 
them intently. Whilst tackling the unfolding nature of this story, much has changed in Saudi 
Arabia since I first began my project. For example, at the start of 2017, the Crown Prince of 
Saudi Arabia, Mohammad Bin Salman, was not the influential figure he is today. He was yet to 
consolidate his political power and had not been seen making pleasant acquaintance with various 
world leaders. With his current status as Saudi Arabia’s soon to be reformist leader, Vision 2030 
will be his major debut achievement. With no current signs of opposition, his vision will become 
the guiding hand for Saudi Arabia for many decades to come, making Vision 2030 less of an end 
date, but rather just the beginning of continuous transformation in the country.  
Yet, there are also considerable complications that are working for and against this 
mission. Going against global cooperation on the climate change objectives, Donald Trump, 
President of the United States, has continuously denounced the Paris Climate Accord during his 
time in office. June 2017, Trump announced that he intends to withdraw the US from the Paris 
Climate Accord.108 He referred to the agreement as unfair, and that the US would suffer from 
expanding environmental policy. As a large world power, the US holds great influence over the 
global climate change discourse and this would mark a major setback in global progress. In 
January 2018, The US president said his country could join the international accord if it had a 
“completely different deal.”109 The uncertainty surrounding the future health of our planet that 
                                               
108 Valerie Volcovici, “U.S. Submits Formal Notice of Withdrawal from Paris Climate Pact,” Reuters, 4 August, 
2017, accessed 24 April, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-climate-usa-paris/u-s-submits-formal-notice-
of-withdrawal-from-paris-climate-pact-idUSKBN1AK2FM.  
109 Graham Ruddick, “Donald Trump says US Could Re-enter Paris Climate Deal,” The Guardian, 28 January, 
2018, accessed 24 April, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/28/donald-trump-says-us-could-re-
enter-paris-climate-deal-itv-interview.  
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was quelled by the groundbreaking Paris Climate Accord has since been exacerbated by words of 
the US president. However, one may argue that this withdrawal will only provide a stronger 
impetus for other nations to expand their commitments and that future climate arrangements will 
be made more binding in order to avoid this situation.  
 The driving force behind the current energy transition is the innovations of technology. 
While politicians and scientists may take years to draw up and sign important legislature on 
climate change, innovations in technology provide them with additional opportunities every 
month.  While the solar farm is a pinnacle example of advanced renewable energy technology, 
their exclusive use by large companies or states makes them less disruptive to the energy status 
quo. It is third party innovators that pose the greatest disruption and the potential of an energy 
revolution. Energy storage is currently one of the largest obstacles to renewable energies 
eventual rise to power. In 2017, we saw energy storage pilot, demonstration and trial projects 
crop up all around the world. In Texas, a demonstration project sought to develop training and 
education on storage for utilities, another in Hawaii identified the ways in which aggregated 
storage can from virtual power plants. In the U.K., a trial began to recycle electric vehicle 
batteries for residential areas, and in Australia projects are underway to utilize advanced 
renewable energy storage in remote communities.110 This is just a small selection of ways that 
energy interests are producing knowledge surrounding the various options for storing energy and 
                                               
110 Peter Maloney, “Storage or Generation? AEP case could help answer the question in Texas,” Utility Dive, 24 
October, 2017, accessed 24 April, 2018. https://www.utilitydive.com/news/storage-or-generation-aep-case-could-
help-answer-the-question-in-texas/507943/, Andy Colthorpe, “Stem Connects 1MW Aggregated Virtual Power 
Plant in Hawaii,” Energy Storage News, 31 January, 2017, accessed 24 April, 2018. https://www.energy-
storage.news/news/stem-connects-1mw-aggregated-virtual-power-plant-in-hawaii, “Battery Recycling Market 
Research Study,” Valpak Consulting, March, 2010, Andy Colthorpe, “Australia’s Northern Territory Deploys 
2MWh Battery for Indigenous Community,” Energy Storage News, 15 August, 2017, accessed 24 April, 2018. 
https://www.energy-storage.news/news/australias-northern-territory-deploys-2mwh-battery-for-indigenous-
community.   
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how storage can support the development of renewables. It should be expected that these projects 
will only become more common and that these kinds of options will make their way into the 
hands of policy makers. 
This is all to say, that while there is considerable evidence that Saudi Arabia will utilize 
renewable energies in order to extend the longevity of oil, the global discourse on climate change 
and global technological innovations may not willingly provide them with this opportunity. This 
points to the importance of Saudi Arabia setting future goals. Critics may be able to point to how 
they have not achieved certain goals or how the goals themselves are unclear. However, in 
regards to energy transition, a certain level of flexibility and willingness to make mistakes is 
required. Saudi Arabia is in a ready position to either further the expansion of solar energy sites 
or to develop other alternative renewable energies. By diversifying their economic revenues, they 
retain their ability to produce revenues from oil but do not make themselves as dependent upon 
it. If the renewable energy revolution comes, it will not have to leave without them.  
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